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Introduction
INTRODUCTION
MICHAEL FREEMAN AND HY ROTHSTEIN 
Can counter insurgency strategies be used to fight urban gangs? This question was discussed 
in a conversation between the Mayor of Salinas, the Provost of the Naval Postgraduate 
School and Representative Sam Farr. It became apparent during that discussion that there 
were many similarities between insurgent behavior and gang behavior—similarities that 
would make a more rigorous analysis worthwhile. 
These similarities are readily apparent when reading General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency 
guidance for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (see Appendix I). In his list of twenty-
four “rules,” many of them resonate, but especially the following: secure and serve the 
population; live among the people; help confront the culture of impunity; hold what we 
secure; foster lasting solutions; consult and build relationships, but not just with those who 
seek us out; walk; act as one team; be first with the truth; fight the information war aggres-
sively; manage expectations; and live our values. Ultimately, these guidelines intend to reach 
the same end state as urban policing does: a safe and secure population.
With this theme in mind, the faculty of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, experts in counterinsurgency operations, were enlisted to address 
these similarities and to share their theories, models, and ideas from their own disciplines of 
political science, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and more. This collection 
of short papers is the result.
The goal of this project is to share the ideas developed to fight insurgents and terrorists and 
see if they can be adapted or modified to help the people of Salinas think about their city’s 
problem with gangs in an innovative way. Consequently, each chapter is intentionally left 
short, as they are intended to stimulate thought more than fully explain any one model or 
theory.  The direct application of each chapter’s concept is left to the reader. 
While this project was put together for Salinas’s use, the ideas developed in these short 
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THE COMPLETE WIN
GORDON H. MCCORMICK
Assuming a conflict is concluded on the battlefield rather than at the negotiating table, 
it will end to the benefit of the winning player in one of three ways: with a “weak win”, a 
“strong win”, or a “complete win.”  Each can be defined as follows.
A weak win is achieved when the prevailing player pushes his opponent across his break-
point but is either unable or unwilling to establish control over the political space the two 
sides were competing over in the first place. A player wins, in this case, by eliminating his 
adversary’s means of organized resistance. Weak wins tend to have a limited shelf life. The 
war is over, in the sense that the enemy is no longer able to mount an organized challenge, 
but the winner does not exercise the level of control over his political environment that is 
necessary to ensure that his opponent does not reconstitute himself and re-emerge as an 
organized threat at a later date. The initiative to do so, under these circumstances, lies with 
the losing rather than the winning side.
A strong win not only results in the elimination of organized resistance but in the establish-
ment of a controlling position over one’s political environment. The prevailing player, in 
this case, will not only succeed in “breaking” his opponent, he will leave him with insuf-
ficient room for maneuver to reorganize himself and return to the fight. His “win” is based 
on the fact that he has eliminated his adversary’s opportunity to resist. He secures this result 
for as long as he maintains the requisite level of political control. The initiative, in these 
circumstances, lies with the winning rather than the losing side. 
A complete win, finally, involves not only pushing the enemy across his breakpoint and 
gaining control over one’s political environment, but resolving the underlying social and 
political factors that gave rise to an organized opposition in the first place. A player wins, 
in this case, by eliminating his adversary’s motivation to resist. In contrast to a strong win, 
which is achieved to one degree or another through the establishment of an “artificial” con-
trol regime that is imposed from the top down, a complete win can be said to be the result 
of a “natural” control that is conferred from the bottom up. Which side holds the initiative 
under these conditions is no longer relevant since the political space that was under dispute 
is no longer divided between two competing sets of players. 
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A weak win, paradoxically, can be difficult to achieve, for both sides. This is usually less 
obvious to state decision makers than it is to the insurgents, who can expect to be acutely 
aware of the force disadvantage they face at the beginning of the game. The insurgency 
cannot push the state across its breakpoint until it is big enough to do so. This can only be 
accomplished, as we have seen, to the extent it establishes a significant level of prior control 
over its mobilizing environment. A “weak” win, therefore, is generally not possible. Less ob-
vious, perhaps, is the fact that the state faces a similar challenge to the degree the insurgency 
retains an insulating information advantage. It will not be able to “see” a large enough slice 
of the enemy’s organization at any one time under these circumstances to break it. As long 
as the insurgents’ capacity to reproduce themselves at least equals their rate of attrition, they 
will remain in the game. Gaining a weak win under these conditions, it should be noted, 
requires the enemy’s cooperation. The insurgents must reveal themselves to be attacked, 
but they have the advantage of doing so at times and places of their own choosing. In the 
absence of mistakes, they control their own losses, thus mitigating the state’s opportunity to 
achieve a weak win.
In cases where a weak win is feasible, it may be possible to go on to achieve a strong win 
after the enemy has been pushed across his breakpoint. All things being equal, it will always 
be easier to establish one’s own controlling presence over society to the degree that you do 
not have to compete with someone else to do it. For reasons I have just noted, however, this 
will often be infeasible because of the difficulties of achieving a weak win in the first place. 
In the absence of a “weak” option, both players are forced to hold out for a strong win if 
they are going to eliminate their opponent. ‘Control’, in these circumstances, is not some-
thing that the winning side can wait to achieve after the fighting is over, it is a precondition 
for bringing the fighting to an end in the first place. For the insurgency, it is a necessary 
condition for overcoming its opening force disadvantage. For the state, it is the necessary 
condition for overcoming its opening information disadvantage. The players, under these 
conditions, cannot expect to control their political environment by “finding, fixing, and 
finishing” the enemy, they will only succeed in “finishing” the enemy by gaining control 
over their environment.
While a strong win, as noted, is more stable than a weak win, a complete win is more stable 
than a strong win. In the case of a weak win, as noted above, the enemy can reconstitute 
himself and return to the fight at any time he chooses. This is not possible with a strong 
win where, by definition, the winner will have “squeezed” his opponent out of the game 
by dominating their common operating environment. Conditions will remain outwardly 
stable for as long as this control regime is maintained. The outward stability enjoyed by the 
winning player in such cases, however, masks a latent or underlying instability that can lead 
to new problems down the road. Any erosion in the winner’s control regime can provide 
the losing side with an opportunity to return to the game. While a “comeback”, in these 
circumstances is not inevitable, the option to do so will once again rest with the opposition. 
A complete win, in principle, eliminates this risk by resolving the motivating divisions that 
lie at the heart of the insurgency in the first place. The would-be opposition is unable to re-
emerge as a political and military challenge because it no longer enjoys the necessary base of 
popular support to do so. Societal stability, under these circumstances, will have been given 
a stable foundation.
These definitions of victory, of course, each represent an ideal type. As a practical matter, 
any real world ‘win’ is likely to be characterized by elements of all three. A winner will 
typically manage to achieve differing levels of success in different parts of his operating 
environment at different points in time. One can easily find precedent, for example, for situ-
ations in which a player has succeeded in gaining a complete win in one or more areas of his 
operating space, a strong win in others, and little more than a weak win in the rest. His op-
ponent, in such instances, has been forced out of the game, but the long run stability of the 
situation is different in different places. With this in mind, I think it is wise to define one’s 
level of success, in any particular case, by its lowest common denominator. Thus, if the win-
ning side succeeds in breaking his opponent and achieving a strong win or even a complete 
win in most areas of the country but has not gained effective control over others, the victory 
should be classified as a weak win. His opponent, in this case, still has the opportunity to 
reassert himself at a later date. While the dividing lines that separate these three conceptions 
of victory are distinct, their application is clearly subject to interpretation. I leave it for the 
reader to do so.
This essay is excerpted from the author’s forthcoming article “A Systems Model of Counterinsurgency Competi-
tion” (2011).
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WICKED PROBLEMS—IMPOSSIBLE 
TO SOLVE AND DIFFICULT TO TAME
REBECCA LORENTZ
The term “wicked problems” was first coined by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in 1973. 
Rittel and Webber noted that science had been developed to deal with ‘tame’ problems 
whereas social and policy problems do not fit into tame definitions. Social problems are 
quite different than the linear problems of math or engineering. Social problems are ladled 
with ethical dilemmas and rely on judgment as part of the solution process. For example, in 
the case of an oil spill, is it more important that an immediate solution be created to protect 
wildlife or to protect the health of the closest population, assuming you cannot have both 
and taking into consideration lost profit related to any action? In general, the more concern 
a population has toward a problem, the more divisive the opinions on solutions will be. 
Additionally, as you begin to ‘solve’ a wicked problem, you may find other problems arise as 
a direct result of your solution, resulting in an even more complex wicked problem. 
Rittel and Webber’s 10 criteria for identifying a wicked problem are: 
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
In urban areas that are plighted with violence or crime, it is often hard to definitively 
name the problem. For example in insurgent situations, is it the violence of the insur-
gency that is the problem or the lack of religious freedom that is the problem leading 
to violence? The problem could be viewed as a government’s lack of policy as it relates 
to the volatile group that leads to hostility and then aggression. At the time of a wicked 
problem, views of the problem will vary. 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
A traditional problem, such as a lack of water, has a stopping point. You know you have 
solved the problem when you have enough water to meet your needs. However, most 
social problems do not have any point that you can call the problem solved and move 
on to the next. For example, when dealing with criminal organizations, even a mass 
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sweep of major players will not solve a city’s problem with criminality or even with 
that particular organization. In fact, it will most likely lead to another, yet unknown, 
problem of what the new organization will look and act like. 
3. Wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad.
With almost any social problem, you are likely to have multiple stakeholders offering their 
opinions of any formed solution. Their outlook on the solution will be dependent on their 
role in the problem arena. A social service worker will have a more positive assessment of a 
social service based solution to gang violence then will a prison guard, for example. With 
wicked problems, a solution cannot be true or false, but each participant in the solution 
process will be asked to identify degrees of ‘good enough’ in the solutions proposed. 
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test to a solution to a wicked problem.
Unlike a mathematical equation, a solution to a wicked problem cannot be immediately 
tried and found to be correct or incorrect. In the case of social issues, it is often genera-
tions before the effects of the solution can be seen. Civil societies are also faced with 
ethical issues as elements of any solution. Therefore, a solution to a wicked problem 
has no test other than to achieve ‘better than before’ results. Impacts that the solution 
makes on related problems must also be considered when evaluating those results. 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot’ operation; because there is no 
opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.
When dealing with insurgencies or criminal organizations there is no trial period for a 
solution. Therefore, a solution must be developed clearly and its response anticipated 
before it is used against a problem that presents great risk to any population. With an 
active wicked problem, there is no extra time to try something new. Something new has 
to work the first time. 
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of 
potential solutions, nor is there a well described set of permissible operations that 
may be incorporated into the plan.
Unlike a sport that has a set of rules and parameters a wicked problem has no such 
limits on potential solutions. In the social issue of gang crime, for example, you can 
increase law enforcement; you can pick a gang and fully arm them assuring their vic-
tory; you can geographically isolate a region where they can operate freely; or you can 
create a host of other solutions. Any of those would impact gang crime – whether the 
impact is good or bad is a judgment call that varies depending on who you ask. The 
spectrum of possibilities can lead to stunting of the solution space, where a solution is 
used over and over again long after it surpasses its effectiveness, because the open space 
of solutions is too intimidating to tackle. On the other hand, if the broad possibilities 
are embraced, they can be coordinated with creativity and collaboration to form a solu-
tion that is as malleable as the wicked problem itself. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
The uniqueness of wicked problems is part of what leads to the difficulty in developing 
taming strategies. What works for one wicked problem will not necessarily work for 
another. Even if the wicked problem is defined the same, different actors have a very dif-
ferent effect on the solution space. For example, two organizations that have the same 
name and basic structure will function differently in a large racially diverse metropolis 
area versus a smaller racially segregated urban area. What works to limit the activities of 
one organization may have little effect on the other. A wicked problem, therefore, has 
to be defined on its own, not as being the same problem dealt with earlier. Elements of 
a previous solution strategy can be used, but the whole system of the strategy must be 
based on each specific problem. 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. 
In the system of prison recidivism, for example, the returning prisoner is not the only 
problem that would need to be included in a solution strategy. Some parts of your 
wicked system would include gang ties in the prison, poverty outside of the prison, 
sentences that allow a prisoner to return to the street too soon, lack of resources for 
reintegrating parolees, and familial criminality that exists in the space a prisoner returns 
to. The problem of recidivism can be identified as a wicked problem in itself or as only a 
part of the wicked problem of poverty or (fill in the blank with any other of the wicked 
problems involved). No wicked problem stands alone.
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9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in 
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s 
resolution. 
An accountant’s take on the problem of a failing small business might be, “More money 
is being spent than is being received, resulting in lack of profit.” The implication is if 
either less money is spent or more is received, the problem is solved. However, if the 
human resource agent took a try and stated, “We do not have enough employees to 
create enough products to sell and make a profit”, then the implied solution is to hire 
more employees. The owner may find the problem to be the rising cost of raw materi-
als; preventing a product from being profitable in the first place. Defining a problem as 
a system of problems is necessary to leaving solution options open.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong. 
Unlike a theorist, the wicked problems player has no time or room to make a hypoth-
esis, and then attempt to prove it. The possible outcomes affect people’s lives, and the 
planners of both the problem definition and the solution strategies are not given the 
opportunity to be wrong or to test out their theories. A wicked problem exists, and the 
expectation is that the solution strategy will tame it. 
So, what can be done about wicked problems? Most theories agree that a wicked problem 
cannot actually be solved, because it is most likely just one element of many other related 
problems that will each change as the wicked problem changes. There are several choices 
for tackling a problem that is in wicked territory. According to N. C. Roberts, in her article 
Coping with Wicked Problems, there are three basic strategies to begin intervention on this 
type of issue: authoritative, competitive and collaborative. Intervening in a wicked problem 
using authoritative strategies means that there is agreement as to who will have the final 
say in the development of a solution. In this scenario authority is given to an individual or 
group of individuals that will evaluate the problem and develop a solution to be tried. Oth-
er stakeholders in the problem agree to abide by and take part in the solution developed by 
this person or group. Selection of the authority holder(s) is usually based on topic expertise, 
experience with similar problems, or solely rank and title. The benefit of a solution by an 
authoritative strategy is how quickly it can be formulated. In a crisis environment, the 
establishment of authority often has a calming effect. The negative side of using authorita-
tive rule over a wicked problem is that you may not have all the information within your 
pool of decided on experts. Separating the problem from the population eliminates them 
as a knowledge resource and may even serve to disengage them from the problem. If you 
need them to be stakeholders in the solution, you may not want to alienate them from your 
solution process.
A competitive strategy arises when you have two bodies relatively equal in authority vying 
for control of the wicked problem territory. Often with government agencies there is a bud-
get that must be divided resulting in a zero-sum competition between departments. If one 
department gets $1 million more, than another department must be losing $1 million. This 
environment creates a situation open to competitiveness in the solution. For example, in a 
City dealing with gang violence, social services and law enforcement may view themselves 
as vying for the same resources. In this case, a competitive strategy would ask each agency 
to propose a solution and the resulting competition of solutions would arrive at the final 
strategy. What you gain with a competitive strategy is the solution that has the most force 
behind it; this can be useful in a contentious environment. What you lose in a competitive 
strategy is the viewpoint and full collaboration of the non-winners. Also, with a competitive 
strategy for taming the problem, you are already narrowing options to a select number of 
participants in the solution development, alienating the knowledge base of the parties not 
involved in the competition. 
Lastly, a collaborative strategy is what is commonly agreed upon as the most useful taming 
strategy (Conklin, 2005; Rittell & Webber, 1973; Roberts, 2000). Collaboration allows for 
each stakeholder in the wicked problem to take part in the solution strategy. For example 
when dealing with international criminal organizations, asking police, federal agents, and 
international agencies to collaborate on the solution strategy ensures that each of those 
participants will engage in their role as solvers. Alienating one group and then imposing a 
developed solution would most likely create an opposition where one had not been before, 
complicating your wicked problem and weakening your likelihood of success. Collabora-
tion, alternatively, allows the problem to be voiced in different perspectives, eventually 
leading to a more whole taming strategy. 
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STRATEGY
DOUGLAS BORER, MICHAEL FREEMAN, AND STEVE TWING
What is strategy? Strategy is related to, but not identical with, policy. As observed distinctly 
by Professor Alan Stolberg, “policy is what to do, strategy is how to do it.” Professor Richard 
Yarger provides the following succinct summary of the US Army’s preferred strategic 
framework, which was first articulated by Colonel Art Lykke “Strategy is all about how 
(ways or concepts) leaders will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to 
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives 
(ends) that support state interests.” To put it simply, strategy is the matching of means 
to ends by particular ways. As such, good strategy is fundamentally comprehensive. The 
strategist must have a wide-ranging vision of what else is happening in the environment, and 
a higher-resolution grasp of the potential interconnected “ripple” effects of various policy 
choices. 
For example, after 9/11, the Bush Administration’s goal (end) was to stop another terrorist 
attack on the USA. When thinking about how to get to that end, it decided that the root 
cause of terrorism was not poverty, was not Islam, was not Israel’s existence, was not US 
foreign policy, nor a handful of other explanations. Rather, it was decided that terrorism 
was rooted in authoritarian governments. People in authoritarian states are blocked from 
venting political frustrations, and as a result they turn to politically-motivated violence. 
Thus, the major “way” that terrorism would be eliminated would be through the spread of 
democracy in the Middle East. The “mean” chosen was military force, and the best places to 
start were Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Ways and means are often discussed using the term power. Thus, power is also a critical 
concept for the strategist. Commonly, amongst military and defense practitioners, power 
is thought of as consisting of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, 
intelligence and law enforcement elements. These are often referred to by the acronym 
‘DIMEFIL’. 
Finally, to have a reasonable chance of success, strategy must maintain an appropriate bal-
ance among the objectives sought, the methods chosen to pursue those objectives, and the 
12 13
Gangs & Guerrillas The Mystic Diamond
resources available to achieve the methods. In other words, for the strategist, ends must be in 
stable equilibrium with ways and means.
To help assess any strategy, one should think about three standards—is it practical, is 
it likely to be effective, and is it legitimate. First, is the strategy practical? Are the basic 
DIMEFIL means available to achieve the ends that have been articulated by policy makers? 
Second, are the concepts (ways) likely to be effective? Are the methods under consideration 
for marshalling state resources likely to produce the desired outcome? This is one of the 
most difficult components because what seems like a good idea at the onset of a conflict, 
might not look so good in hindsight (e.g. democratizing Iraq sounded good, but after three 
democratic elections, the country still suffers from routine terror attacks). 
Finally, the strategist must always ask whether the ends, ways, and means are legitimate. 
This third standard for evaluation, or the “political litmus test,” is an especially important 
concern for leaders of democracies, whose authority to govern is embedded in—and ulti-
mately dependent upon—the approval of their citizens. One can imagine that shortly after 
the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, discussions in the administration of George W. 
Bush included a broad scope of options available for responding to al Qaeda. One available 
option was going nuclear. Indeed, if the desired end was the physical destruction of Osama 
Bin Laden and the main elements of al Qaeda’s leadership cadre, dropping two nuclear 
bombs on Afghanistan—one in Kabul, and one in Kandahar—would have had a very high 
probability of success. However, due to the indiscriminate nature of these weapons, and 
the high casualty toll amongst innocent Afghans, it is clear that such a U.S. response would 
have been deemed highly illegitimate, not only by the international community, but also 
by the majority of the citizens of the United States. The U.S. would have quickly morphed 
from being the victim of a horrendous crime to being the perpetrator of an even greater act 
of cruelty. Maintaining the moral high ground, and passing the legitimacy test, is a vital 
imperative for the broad-thinking strategist.
In sum, thinking strategically, and constructing good strategies, are complex but necessary 
endeavors. By remembering the basic ends-ways-means framework, and thinking first about 
practicality, effectiveness, and legitimacy before taking action, policy-makers and policy-
implementers can avoid making many errors when designing strategies for the public sphere. 
THE MYSTIC DIAMOND: APPLYING 
THE DIAMOND MODEL OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
GREG WILSON
The U.S. approach in the Southern Philippines has been an unconventional or indirect 
approach of working “through, by, and with” indigenous forces. Applying the principles 
and theories from Gordon McCormick’s strategic counterinsurgency model, called the 
“Diamond” model, planners under the leadership of General Donald Wurster and Colonel 
David Fridovich crafted the guiding strategy. This model provides a useful framework 
in developing a holistic approach to separate insurgent or terrorist organizations like the 
Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyya from their base of popular support so they can 
be isolated, captured or killed. The Government of the Philippines (GOP) and Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have now come to know this as the “Basilan Model” after 
its application against the Abu Sayyaf Group on Basilan Island in 2002. It will be useful to 
examine this model in detail.
The “Diamond” model establishes a comprehensive framework that considers the interac-
tions between the state or host nation government, the insurgents or terrorists, the local 
populace, and international actors or sponsors. The state or the “host nation” government’s 
goal is to destroy the insurgents or limit their growth and influence to a manageable level. 
The insurgent or terrorist’s goal is to grow large enough to destroy the state’s control mecha-
nisms and replace the existing government or force some form of political concession from 
the government that achieves their desired goals. 
To develop an effective strategy, the state must first understand its advantages and disad-
vantages relative to the insurgents. The state, which normally has an established security 
apparatus consisting of armed forces and police, has a force advantage over the insurgents 
but suffers from an information disadvantage. This information disadvantage stems from 
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the fact that the insurgents or terrorists are difficult to detect and target because they are 
dispersed and embedded in the local populace. 
The insurgents, on the other hand, are generally weak and suffer from a force disadvantage 
but enjoy a marked information advantage. The information advantage stems from the fact 
that they have visibility of the state’s security apparatus and infrastructure, which they can 
easily target. McCormick asserts that, “the winner of this contest will be the side that can 
most quickly resolve its disadvantage.” The state’s goal then should be to rectify its informa-
tion disadvantage so it can effectively locate the insurgents and capture or kill them. The 
insurgent or terrorist’s goal is then to grow in strength and effectiveness so it can threaten 
the state’s security apparatus and infrastructure before the state can rectify its information 
disadvantage. Time is typically on the side of the insurgent or terrorist because they can 
often achieve their goals by merely surviving and exhausting government efforts and the 
political will to eradicate them. 
The model establishes the optimal strategy for the state to pursue in order to rectify its 
information disadvantage and ultimately win the counterinsurgency fight. The Legs (1 
through 5) of the “Diamond” model represent the sequence of the strategy. We will first 
examine the upper half of the model, which represents the internal environment to the 
state. Since the state suffers from an information disadvantage it must first pursue Leg 1 in 
order to strengthen its influence and control over the local populace. McCormick defines 
control as “the ability to see everything in one’s area of operation that might pose a threat 
to security and the ability to influence what is seen.” This level of visibility requires an 
extensive human intelligence network and cannot be achieved by technical means. Accord-
ing to military strategist John Paul Vann, “We need intelligence from the local civilians and 
soldiers from the area who understand the language, customs, and the dynamics of the local 
situation, who can easily point out strangers in the area even though they speak the same 
language…” .
Popular support can be viewed as a zero-sum game, which implies that one side’s loss is the 
other’s gain and vice versa. Strengthening ties with the local populace by focusing on their 
needs and security denies or degrades insurgent influence over the people and leads to infor-
mation revealing insurgent infrastructure. This allows the state to attack Leg 2 by conduct-
ing operations that disrupt the insurgent’s control mechanisms over the local populace and 
directly target insurgent infrastructure. Successful visibility and targeting of the insurgent’s 
infrastructure will lead to actionable intelligence, which can be used to target the insurgent’s 
core leadership and foot soldiers. Actionable intelligence gained through patiently pursuing 
efforts along Leg 1 and 2 first, allows the state to see and strike the insurgents along Leg 3. 
Military forces conducting counterinsurgency operations typically ignore Legs 1–2 of the 
model and attempt to directly target the insurgents or terrorists. This usually leads to large-
scale search and destroy operations, as witnessed during the Vietnam War, that are easily 
avoided by the insurgents and often produce collateral damage that alienates the local popu-
lace. The majority of insurgencies can be defeated operating effectively along Legs 1 through 
3, in that sequence. The overall strategy internal to the state identifies the local populace 
and winning popular support as the center of gravity (COG) in the counterinsurgency fight 
and the key to the state’s ability to rectify its information disadvantage and win the conflict. 
The indirect approach of working through the local populace and indigenous security forces 
to target the insurgents thus becomes the most direct path to victory.
Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model
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The lower half of the “Diamond” model represents the external environment. If an exter-
nal sponsor is involved, the state can directly target the flow of support to the insurgents 
by attacking Leg 4. These efforts typically target supplies and financing flowing into the 
insurgent or terrorist organization. Additionally, the state can use Leg 5 to gain support and 
resources for its counterinsurgency efforts from partner nations and other international ac-
tors while employing diplomatic pressure and other punitive measures to directly influence 
the behavior of sponsors supporting the insurgents. 
In February 2002, U.S. Special Forces (SF) advisors applied principles found in the “Dia-
mond” model to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in separating insurgents 
from the local populace in the Southern Philippines. The U.S. became interested in the 
Southern Philippines shortly before 9/11 when the al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 
several U.S. citizens and held them hostage on their island stronghold of Basilan. After 
9/11, the region became a frontline in the GWOT when Washington and Manila set their 
sights on the destruction of Abu Sayyaf.
The first goal was to establish a secure environment and protect the local populace. SF advi-
sory teams went to work immediately honing AFP military skills through focused training 
activities that increased unit proficiency and instilled confidence. According to an SF advi-
sor, “SF detachments converted AFP base camps on Basilan into tactically defensible areas, 
and they trained Philippine soldiers and marines in the combat lifesaving skills needed 
for providing emergency medical treatment with confidence. Those lifesaving skills were a 
significant morale booster for the AFP.” Training was accompanied by increased patrolling 
activities, which allowed the AFP and local security forces to re-establish security at the 
village level and regain the initiative from the insurgents. SF advisors credit an aggressive 
increase in AFP patrolling in denying the Abu Sayyaf Group its habitual sanctuary and cur-
tailing their movement. Additionally, SF advisory teams played a key role in building AFP 
capacity by accompanying units as advisors on combat operations. The re-establishment 
of security and the protection of the local populace provided the foundation for all other 
activities designed to build off of Leg 1 of the model.
Once security was established both civil affairs and SF soldiers, working with their AFP 
counterparts, began executing high impact projects that produced immediate and positive 
results for the local populace. Humanitarian assistance and civic action (HA/CA) projects 
were initially targeted to meet the basic needs of the local populace and then were further 
refined and tailored for particular regions and provinces based on assessment results. As the 
security situation improved, a U.S. Naval Construction Task Group deployed to the island 
to execute large-scale projects like digging wells, construction projects and improvements 
to roads and bridges. Infrastructure projects like improvements to roads and piers served a 
dual purpose by directly enhancing military capabilities but also benefiting local residents. 
When possible, locally procured materials and workers were used on projects to put money 
directly into the local economy. Humanitarian and civic-action projects on Basilan im-
proved the images of the AFP and the Manila government, and they helped return law and 
order to the island. Additionally, the projects earned local respect, improved force-protec-
tion measures and reduced Muslim village support for the terrorists on Basilan—serving as 
a key component in Leg 1 of the model, enabling the AFP to cultivate closer relations and 
strengthen their control over the local populace in insurgent influenced areas. 
Special Forces advisors put the AFP in the lead on all activities and projects while the 
U.S. military played a supporting role. Putting the AFP in the lead served to enhance the 
legitimacy of the AFP/GOP at the grass roots level, severing passive support for the insur-
gents. Targeted humanitarian assistance and civic action projects served to drive a wedge 
between Abu Sayyaf and the local populace, disrupting Leg 2 of the model. These activities 
also provided a chance to interact with the locals and tap into the “bamboo telegraph” or in-
digenous information network. As villagers became more comfortable, they openly shared 
information on the local situation with AFP and U.S. forces.
Intelligence sharing was also critical to the operation. SF advisors, skilled in human intelli-
gence, conducted extensive information-collection activities providing situational awareness 
and contributing to a safe and secure environment. U.S. advisors shared intelligence with 
their AFP counterparts and assisted them in fusing all sources of information to develop 
better fidelity on Abu Sayyaf ’s organizational structure. Improved relations with the local 
residents also generated increased reporting on Abu Sayyaf activity to local security forces. 
Advisors also leveraged U.S. military intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
platforms. These assets were integrated into intelligence collection plans in support of 
AFP combat operations. Improved intelligence served to generate actionable intelligence 
enabling the execution of Leg 3 or direct combat operations by the AFP against Abu Sayyaf. 
U.S. Embassy efforts to encourage information sharing between countries and efforts to 
disrupt financial support for terrorist organizations throughout Southeast Asia further 
reinforced efforts along Leg 4 and 5 of the “Diamond” model. 
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By August 2002, just six months later, the synergistic effects of security, improved AFP 
military capability, and focused civil military operations quickly isolated the Abu Sayyaf 
Group from their local support networks. As the security situation on the island continued 
to improve people who had fled the island began to return, including doctors, teachers and 
other professional workers. Additional resources from the Philippine Government, United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Growth and Equity in Mindanao 
(GEM), Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and non government orga-
nizations (NGO) were also brought in to further address the root causes of the civil unrest.
RATIONALITY OF VIOLENCE 
MICHAEL FREEMAN
What happens when people become desensitized to violence? For terrorist groups—who 
use violence for strategic purposes—this can have dramatic effects on how much violence 
they need to produce. In fact, a desensitization to violence can create incentives that force 
terrorist groups to change: their choices are either to escalate their levels of violence or stop 
their campaign of violence altogether. If they choose to escalate, eventually they will run 
into two sets of constraints: their own capacity to produce violence will have upper limits, 
and their own constituents will not accept violence over a certain level.
To understand these dynamics better, it is useful to back up theoretically and first under-
stand how violence creates terrorism. First, let’s assume that a terrorist group creates a steady 
level of violence over time (for example, 3 roadside bombs per week). This is the “actual” 
level of violence. Second, the amount of terror is based on the “actual” level of violence mi-
nus what the population will feel is an “accepted” level of violence. Of course, a population 
will always want there to be no violence; however, they will accept some amount of violence 
before they demand that the government 
does anything new or different to decrease 
the threat. Similarly, the population of a 
city wants zero crime, but will accept a few 
robberies or even murders a year before it 
demands sweeping reforms of the police 
department or that budgets be reallocated. 
This basic dynamic is captured in the 
figure at left.
Over time, however, the population’s “accepted” level of violence may change. Consistent 
with findings in psychology, people adapt to their surroundings and simply “get used to 
it.” When faced with a continuous campaign of terrorism violence, populations may start 
to revise their expectations of what is “normal.” This seems to be the case in countries like 
Israel, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Iraq, and others, where the populations’ expectations of 
terrorist violence has changed over time. When this happens, the line of “accepted” violence 
begins to rise. This does not mean that the population wants more violence, just that the 
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amount of violence required to create a 
condition of terror is higher. Because the 
population becomes used to violence, the 
gap between the actual and accepted levels 
of violence will shrink and the amount of 
terror (which is the size of this gap) will 
correspondingly shrink as well. Over time, 
then, terrorist violence actually loses its 
effectiveness. Eventually, it is possible that 
the population’s accepted level of violence may even exceed the actual level of violence. 
Alternatively, instead of terrorism losing 
its effectiveness, this dynamic may cause 
terrorist groups to escalate their level of 
actual violence to recreate the gap between 
the “actual” and “accepted” lines. 
At this point, though, there may be an ad-
ditional variable or factor that comes into 
play. While terrorists have incentives to 
maintain a level of actual violence higher 
than what the population expects, they may also have upper bounds to how much violence 
they can perpetrate because they must take into account what their own constituency of 
sympathizers will accept. Many people think of terrorists as having no upper constraints on 
their use of violence; they will use as much violence as they can whenever they can. In fact, 
though, they have to maintain their legitimacy among their supporters. If the actual level 
of violence exceeds what their own supporters will accept, their supporters will turn away 
from the terrorists. This is an important constraint on terrorist action and we see numer-
ous examples of when terrorist groups cross this upper ceiling, including in Iraq, Northern 
Ireland, Japan, and elsewhere. 
In essence, terrorists must operate in the gap between the population’s level of accepted vio-
lence and their sympathizers’ level of accepted violence. These two lines provide the lower 
and upper bounds on the level of violence that will be rational for terrorists to use. Too little 
and the violence will not terrorize; too much and they will lose the backing of their own 
supporters. 
Because this framework is meant as just 
a model of terrorist violence, it simplifies 
many of the issues involved. For example, 
the accepted levels of violence by the 
sympathizers and by the populace are pre-
sented as aggregate measures. Even within 
one country, however, different people 
will accept different levels of violence. This 
aggregation of what is acceptable to the 
population is also mirrored in the aggre-
gation of the supporters’ level of acceptance. They too will have disagreements over what 
constitutes an acceptable level of violence for the group they support. These internal debates 
provide an opportunity for the state to try to delegitimize violence for some portions of the 
population and will be discussed below. Another interesting dynamic not captured by the 
simplifications of the diagram is that different kinds of violence and different targets of vio-
lence have varying consequences. As presented in the diagram, the actual level of violence is 
conceived as essentially a measure of deaths or damage caused by terrorism. But how people 
die and who dies matters as well. 
This diagram also helps understand and contextualize much of what the government is and 
should be doing to address the threat of terrorism. Put simply, the government can take 
actions to alter all three lines depicted in the diagram. The goal is to lower both the actual 
violence and the sympathizers’ accepted level of violence, while raising the population’s level 
of accepted violence. This would narrow the gap between the upper (sympathizers’ level) 
and lower (population’s level) bounds to narrow the space where terror can be created, 
while trying to lower the level of actual violence below this band. Alternatively, in some 
situations the government might aim to keep the population’s level of accepted violence low 
because otherwise, if people accept high levels of violence, then the government would lack 
the political support necessary to devote greater resources to the problem. Also, with higher 
levels of accepted violence, the population may start to accept higher levels of other forms 
of violence besides terrorism.
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DETERRENCE
LEO BLANKEN
Deterrence is about trying to use the threat of punishment, or increasing expected costs 
of the activity, to prevent an actor from taking an action they might otherwise take. For 
deterrence to work, the threat must be credible. To make a threat credible, the deterring 
actor has to show that it has the capacity and the resolve to carry out the threat. By 
threatening some retaliatory punishment if the target acts, the deterring actor is trying to 
change the target’s calculation regarding that act. In other words, successful deterrence is 
about manipulating the expected costs-benefits such that costs outweigh benefits and target 
chooses not to take the action in question. This is commonly referred to as an “expected 
utility equation.” This “expected utility equation” is really about the balance between sticks 
and carrots, or costs and benefits. 
To illustrate deterrence at work, imagine a gang of robbers. They are considering robbing 
a bank—how could they be deterred? In other words, how could their expected utility for 
attempting the bank robbery be manipulated, such that expected costs outweigh expected 
benefits? 
•	 The costs for choosing the act could be increased. If the current jail sentence for 
bank robbery is 5 years in prison, this could be increased to 10 years.
•	 The probability of accruing those costs could be increased. If the budget for the 
local police force is increased, the likelihood of catching the robbers is increased.
•	 The benefits of choosing the act can be reduced. If the bank normally keeps one 
million dollars in cash in the vault, this could be reduced to $500,000.
•	 The probability of accruing those benefits could be reduced. The vault and security 
systems of the bank could be updated to make the success of the attempted bank 
robbery less likely. 
These four parameters address the costs and benefits as well as the probability of accruing 
costs and benefits. This relationship can be thought of mathematically as:
Costs × Probability of Costs > Benefits × Probability of Benefits  
Or, in shorthand: C×P(C) > B×P(B)
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In these equations, the actor is deterred (expected costs outweigh expected benefits). Any 
of these four parameters could be manipulated to decrease the robbers expected utility of 
choosing the act. If in the end they forego the action due to this manipulation, then deter-
rence is deemed to have been a success. 
Classic deterrence: The Cold War nuclear standoff
The most famous example of deterrent policy at work was the nuclear stalemate between 
the USSR and the USA. What stopped each state from destroying each other? The leader 
of each state was deterred. Each knew that if they launched first, a retaliatory strike from the 
enemy’s hardened silos and submarines would destroy his own country. No possible foreign 
policy goal was worth more than this, so neither initiated an attack. So, in this case, each 
country had a credible deterrent threat—both the capacity and resolve to destroy something 
highly valued by the opponent. 
Deviations from the classic deterrence model
The classic deterrent model contains two unitary-rational actors who make threats against 
one another. Their only consideration is making those threats credible by communicating 
their resolve and capacity. Once threats are communicated, each actor makes expected utility 
calculations while considering what actions to take. Is the world always this simple?
There are many ways to manipulate the classic deterrent model to account for further com-
plexity. Three common ways to confound the classic model is to assume: 
1: The actor attempting deterrence cannot target something the opponent values 
2: The opponent is not rational  
3: The opponent is not unitary
Nothing to target 
How can the actor attempting deterrence deal with an opponent that does not have an 
obvious target for punishment? If this is the case you can focus on reducing the actor’s 
likelihood of success or the benefits of achieving its goals. This was illustrated by the bank 
robber example. Even if you remove the first two policy options (increasing the jail terms 
or increasing the size of the local policy force) you can still focus on increasing the bank’s 
security systems and reducing the amount of cash in the vault to manipulate the robbers’ 
expected utility. This is often called “deterrence by denial” and seeks to lower the benefits of 
the adversary. Classical deterrence, on the other hand, is often called “deterrence by punish-
ment” and seeks to raise the costs of the adversary. 
Not rational
Usually when people say—“you can’t model this actor as rational”—they really mean one of 
these:
1: The actor has complicated goals. 
2: The goals don’t make any sense to me (they have to do with fundamentalist religion, 
racism, tribal culture or something else that is alien to me as the researcher). 
3: The actor is playing several “games” at once (President Obama has to make trade 
deals to satisfy BOTH international trade partners AND domestic steel worker 
unions—he is optimizing two rational decisions at once).
Assuming rationality is a huge help in simplifying theory and policy. Moving away from it 
either introduces serious complexity (you have to work up some unique decision calculus 
for the opponent because he is deemed to be unique) or your ability to model them at all 
goes out the window (because his actions are essentially random and unknowable).
Not unitary
Another assumption is that an actor is a seamless monolith. So when the New York Times 
says “France was upset at the United Nations’ ruling…” it is making a unitary assumption. 
What is “France”? The president? The parliament? The voters? It is really a conglomeration 
of 100 million people and many institutions—but we find it useful to treat it as an anthro-
pomorphized being. 
Should you treat a terrorist group—or a street gang—as unitary actor, or not? There is no 
right or wrong answer. You may do both at different times. Consider again the bank robbers 
example. You can attempt to craft a deterrent policy for the whole gang (as was done in the 
example). Or, you may “decompose” the bank robbing gang into a network of planners, rob-
bers, lookouts, drivers, suppliers, girlfriends/wives/mothers, et cetera. Once you have done 
this you may proceed to craft unique “micro-level” deterrent strategies for each compo-
nent—altering each individual’s decision to participate in the bank robbery. 
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BECOMING A TERRORIST: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
MICHAEL FREEMAN
Why do individuals become terrorists? Specifically, what psychological processes do they 
have to go through in order to commit acts of violence that would otherwise be seen as 
illegitimate? The vast majority of people find acts of terrorism morally reprehensible, 
especially attacks that target large numbers of innocent civilians. Yet, for individuals to 
become terrorists they must overcome these moral restraints. In fact, terrorists must come 
to see their own actions as the only legitimate and moral possibility; inaction would be 
immoral and illegitimate. How do would-be terrorists make this transition?
A useful model for understanding this process has been developed by Fathali Moghaddam, 
a psychologist, who describes this process as climbing a narrowing staircase with 6 floors (a 
ground floor plus five higher floors). This is depicted below as a pyramid just for the sake of 
visual simplicity.
The difference between terrorists and other individuals is that terrorists climb all the way to 
the top floor, while others drop off sometime before reaching the top.
Ground Floor
On the ground floor are all the people 
who feel deprivation and feel victim-
ized by some perceived injustices. Inter-
estingly, individually felt deprivations 
(I want more power) are not the kind 
that lead to terrorism. Instead, fraternal 
deprivations (my people deserve more 
power) are much more important in 
driving individuals to engage in acts of 
political violence. 
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First Floor
The people who climb to the first floor are looking for solutions to their communal griev-
ance, but they fail in improving their situation. Often this frustration is compounded by 
issues of procedural injustice. Whereas distributive justice refers to the fairness of outcomes, 
procedural justice refers to how fair people see the decision-making process. When indi-
viduals have no say in the decision-making process, issues of procedural injustice become 
more salient. 
Second Floor
Those that climb to the second floor displace their aggression towards an enemy. Their 
inability to solve their grievances is due to the actions of “others” and not their own fault. 
Poverty and powerlessness in Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, for example, 
are blamed on British policies. Likewise, the economic and social problems in Egypt or 
Saudi Arabia are the fault of the United States. By forming a distinct and hated “other” the 
individual also strengthens his conception of who “we” are and increasingly views issues 
through an “us-versus-them” lens. 
Third Floor
On the third floor is where would-be terrorists began to engage with the morality and ideol-
ogy of the terrorist group. They begin to believe that violence is legitimate because it is nec-
essary to address the grievances of the individual and the community from which he comes. 
They have not yet joined the terrorist group, but begin socializing with existing members of 
a terrorist organization or learning about its ideology through texts or on the internet.
Fourth Floor
On the fourth floor, individuals formally join the terrorist organization through outside 
recruitment or as a “walk-in.” They further consolidate their “us-versus-them” thinking, 
often to the point of thinking that only members of the terrorist group themselves are true 
believers. 
Fifth Floor
At the top of the staircase is the individual who commits acts of terrorism. At this stage, 
the individual has started with grievances, failed to address those grievances, blamed others 
for the grievances, began to accept the morality of the terrorists’ ideology, joined a terrorist 
group, and finally committed violence. 
This model is useful for a variety of reasons, but also has some limitations. First, it is useful 
because it highlights the fact that would-be terrorists go through a psychological process 
before becoming a terrorist. They are not simply born a terrorist. Also, this model provides 
opportunities to disrupt this process. Already built into the model is the notion that, at 
each stage, fewer and fewer people move up the staircase. If billions of people exist on 
the ground floor, only a few tens of thousands of people are at the top of the staircase. 
Clearly, many people with grievances do not even try to change their situation and so stay 
on the ground floor. Likewise, many people may feel frustration and deprivation and even 
blame somebody else for their problems, but are unwilling to engage with the morality of 
a terrorist ideology. This model also provides specific solutions to make the staircase even 
narrower: addressing grievances and providing opportunities for people to engage in the 
decision-making process (reducing procedural injustice) are ways to shrink the ground and 
first floors of the staircase.
Because this is a simple model, there are also some complexities not taken into account by 
it. For example, it is not clear if the floors have to be climbed in the order presented above. 
Moreover, do individuals have to climb through all floors or can they skip a floor? Also, is it 
possible for individuals to backtrack in addition to simply no longer climbing any higher? 
Lastly, how quickly can this progression up the staircase occur? There is definitely some 
variation in how long it takes individuals to climb this staircase. While some take months or 
years to make an orderly climb up the staircase, other individuals could essentially take the 
“express elevator” directly to the top. A youth who sees his cousin shot by soldiers operating 
in his perceived homeland, for instance, would probably very quickly understand that his 
people are deprived of their homeland by occupying forces that can only be resisted through 
violence. He might even join a terrorist group that same day and avenge his cousin’s death as 
soon as possible. 
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Once a person becomes a terrorist, we tend to think that there is no going back. In fact, 
however, terrorists often leave the organization and return to a life of non-violence. 
Likewise, terrorist groups, as organizations, also often turn away from violence. Recently 
there has been a growing literature within terrorism studies that tries to understand how 
these processes of deradicalization and disengagement occur.
There are essentially two sets of actors we are interested in: terrorist individuals and terrorist 
groups. Also, there are two broad ways for either actor to stop a life of violence: the benefits 
of engaging in violence are higher than the costs, such that it is no longer rational for the 
terrorist or group to continue (disengagement); or they can have issues with the legitimacy 
of the movement’s ideology and turn away from it (deradicalization). For visual purposes, 





Individuals turn away from terrorism when the costs of continuing exceed the benefits. This 
can occur in a variety of ways. 
First, terrorists may become disillusioned with the tactics or strategies of the group because 
they may feel that the tactics or strategies are unlikely to lead to their desired goals. This may 
be especially likely to occur when the terrorist group is struggling or failing. 
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Second, they may be distracted by other activities. Often, terrorists engage in criminal 
activities (smuggling, drugs, kidnappings) to finance their operations and turn away from 
violence to pursue financial rewards.
Third, terrorists often disengage because they become tired of living a life on the run from 
police and security forces. Arrests and imprisonment make the costs of being a terrorist 
higher. Also, they often want to get married and start families. Additionally, the community 
in which they operate may look unfavorably upon them. All of this makes the costs of being 
a terrorist greater and leads to burnout.
Fourth, terrorists tend to “retire” after a certain age. Many of the benefits associated with a 
terrorist lifestyle (excitement, status, etc.) have less appeal as individuals age. 
Fifth, when terrorist groups are infiltrated by security forces, members begin to distrust each 
other. This distrust weakens the individuals’ sense of being part of a vanguard or missionary 
organization and also increases the possibility of being incarcerated.
Sixth, amnesty programs often lead to disengagement because the government changes 
the cost-benefit calculation of individual terrorists. Many terrorists in Italy and Peru, for 
example, have taken advantage of amnesty programs to leave violence behind.
Individual Deradicalization
Individuals also turn away from terrorism in several ways because they no longer believe in 
the radical ideology of the group.
First, individuals may become disillusioned with the disconnect between their fantasy and 
reality. Terrorist groups often promise a life of excitement shared by similarly dedicated 
individuals. The reality is that terrorist groups are often populated and even led by liars, 
cheaters, and thugs. The ideology of the group may lose its power to inspire individual 
members.
Second, individuals may deradicalize when they become disillusioned with the level, type, 
or target of their attacks. High casualty attacks against innocent civilians (and children 
especially) often “cross the line” of what even terrorists find acceptable. 
Third, terrorists often deradicalize when they no longer agree with the ultimate goal of the 
organization. 
Group Disengagement
Terrorist groups also sometimes renounce the use of violence for several reasons.
First, terrorist groups often splinter when enough members disagree with the means or ends 
of the terrorist group. Often, these splinter groups are more likely to negotiate or renounce 
violence altogether.
Second, terrorist groups turn away from violence because of the repressive actions of the 
state. For example, widespread arrests and harsh punishments led the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt to cease its violent activities. 
Third, terrorist groups may renounce violence when they achieve their goals. 
Group Deradicalization
Terrorist groups also deradicalize when they collectively change their ideological focus. This 
can happen in several ways:
First, the arrest or death of a terrorist leader may have a detrimental effect on the organiza-
tion. Often, the leader himself, through a “cult of personality,” is personally responsible for 
inspiring individuals to join. If the leader is captured or killed, this inspiration may be hard 
to replace.
Second, the prospects of negotiation or conciliation often cause a group to deradicalize. 
Central to their ideology is the belief that the ends (violence and terrorism) are justified to 
achieve their ends. If other ways of achieving their ends are possible, terrorist groups may 
view terrorism as a less necessary tool.
Third, terrorist groups may deradicalize when they lose the support of their constituents. 
Terrorist groups usually see themselves as the vanguard of a larger community and when the 
community’s support drops or never materializes, terrorist groups often question their own 
ideology.
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SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
SEAN EVERTON
It is often assumed that social movements and insurgencies emerge when individuals 
become angry enough about some social condition that they organize in order to bring 
about change. While there is certainly an element of truth in this assumption, in most 
societies there are plenty of individuals dissatisfied with the status quo, but few become 
activists or form a social movement. Instead, other factors need to fall into place before a 
social movement can emerge. The model of social movement emergence that has gained 
the most purchase is Doug McAdam’s “political process model,” which takes into account 
the opportunities that shape the actions of social movements, the variables internal to 
movements (such as organization, commitment, responsibility, beliefs, and values) as 
well as the external constraints upon their emergence. McAdam argues that in order for 
a movement to successfully mobilize, not only do people need to harbor grievances of 
some kind, but (1) they also need to recognize that they share their grievances with others 
and that together they can do something about them (i.e., development of an insurgent 
consciousness); (2) they need to have access to sufficient resources (adequate financing, 
network of potential members and organizations, leaders, meeting places, etc.) in order to 
mobilize on their own without having to rely on external funding (i.e., mobilizing resources); 
and (3) the broader political environment needs to become “open” to insurgency formation 
(i.e., political opportunities). As one can see from the following diagram of the model, 
these three factors are, in turn, influenced by broad socio-economic forces, such as wars, 
economic crises, and so on.
In isolation these factors are 
insufficient to generate and 
sustain an insurgency. When 
they converge, however, a social 
movement’s emergence becomes 
more likely. Specifically, when 
expanding political oppor-
tunities interact with strong 
indigenous organizations, they 
provide potential insurgents 
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with the “structural potential” for collective action; this interaction, then, can lead to the 
development of an insurgent consciousness that can transform the movement’s “structural 
potential” into an actual insurgency.
Expanding Political Opportunities
Expanding political opportunities manifest themselves in three broad forms: (1) political 
instability, (2) enhanced political positions of the aggrieved populations, and (3) ideologi-
cal openness. Political instability can occur when control of the existing power structure 
weakens. In order to maintain the status quo, dominant groups must expend their political 
capital and resources to counter movements that are attempting to exploit the instabil-
ity. Short duration events, such as economic crises, armed conflict, and traumatic world 
events (war, pestilence, drought, tsunami, earthquake, etc), can shake the existing political 
structure and raise the possibility of policy reforms that benefit aggrieved populations as 
the dominant group seeks to maintain stability. A relative increase in the political position 
(i.e., power) of aggrieved populations can result from broad social changes that occur over 
extended periods of time. Finally, broad social changes can lead the social environment to 
tolerate and even become open to alternative and potentially subversive ideas espoused by the 
aggrieved population and associated movements.
Sufficient Mobilizing Resources
Favorable changes in the political environment only increase the probability that budding 
movements will be able to mobilize successfully. Whether they actually do so or not also 
depends on whether activists have access to the resources (sometimes referred to as mobiliz-
ing structures) necessary to mobilize and sustain their cause. One important resource can 
be the increase in the education and wealth within the aggrieved population and/or access 
(i.e., ties) to the financial resources of sympathetic supporters. Another is the network of 
formal and informal organizations from which they can recruit and retain individuals as 
well mobilize and sustain their cause. Insurgencies need organizations to link individuals 
to insurgencies to form and sustain the moral outrage that leads people to join insurgen-
cies and facilitate the mobilization and deployment of their activities. This indigenous 
network of individuals and organizations contribute other key resources to insurgencies: 
leaders, feelings of group solidarity, monitoring of participants (this is especially important 
when defection poses serious security issues to insurgencies) and communication net-
works. Finally, incipient movements often need “free spaces” (e.g., coffee houses, religious 
institutions, neighborhood bars, student lounges) that are beyond the surveillance and 
control of institutionalized authorities where they can frame the narratives (e.g., “we shall 
overcome”) that typically accompany successful mobilization efforts (see below).
Development of an Insurgent Consciousness
People who are content with the current political and social climate are unlikely to form 
or participate in a movement to bring about social change. Rather, a social movement 
draws people who are unhappy with the status quo. Nevertheless, as we noted at the outset 
discontent (i.e., grievances) by itself does not produce social movements; there also needs 
to be an accompanying transformation of consciousness. People must recognize that they 
share these grievances with others and believe that they can do something about them. 
Put simply, they must experience some sort of cognitive realization that change is not only 
necessary but also possible. Christian Smith calls this transformation “the development of 
an insurgent consciousness,” which he defines as a “collective state of understanding” that 
perceives, interprets, and explains a social situation in such a way that it compels people 
to organize and act in order to change the social situation. It goes without saying that a 
budding social movement cannot expect that all potential members will be able to fully 
understand the group’s ideology, however. Thus, insurgent elites generally try to frame their 
group’s core message as ideological snippets that are easily communicated to (and resonate 
with) potential followers and the general public. What becomes important, then, is identi-
fying not only the grievances that helped give rise to a particular social movement but also 
to how the movement’s leaders framed the movement’s ideology in ways that helped them 
attract and retain followers.
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UNDERSTANDING ‘CULTURE’
ANNA SIMONS
Ask ten anthropologists to define ‘culture’ and they will likely offer up eleven different 
definitions. Probably the best is: “culture is anything from what people make with their 
hands to what they think in their heads.” When non-anthropologists use the term ‘culture’ 
they typically mean: shared norms, traditions, habits, customs, and world views. Not all 
anthropologists agree that focusing on people’s ‘culture’ is the best approach to trying to figure 
out what makes people tick—or, what makes them say what they say and do what they do.
Take, for instance, the idea of military culture. Maybe it is useful to think in terms of U.S. 
military culture when comparing the U.S. military to militaries of other countries, or even 
when probing civil-military relations in the U.S.; maybe there is something unique about 
military vs. civilian culture. But there is a problem with assuming such a thing as a military 
culture exists, since not all Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) 
are the same. Examine any one of these and not even all Branches within any one Service are 
the same. For instance, members of U.S. Army Special Forces present a very different image—
and have different norms, traditions, habits, customs, and perspectives on the world—than do 
members of the Army Medical Corps. Factor in location, or whether units are operating dur-
ing peacetime or war, and these represent additional angles that have to be taken into account.
What further complicates matters is: are soldiers only soldiers? Or, perhaps a better way to 
put this is: when do soldiers have to act like soldiers, and when can they behave more like 
the citizens they also are, since in addition to being members of the military they are also 
sons, brothers, husbands, fathers (or daughters, sisters, wives and mothers), consumers, vot-
ers, etc. In other words, how deep do military influences and allegiances run, and for whom 
exactly, under what circumstances? Since the only accurate answer to questions like these 
is “it all depends,” ‘culture’ as an all-purpose explanation for why people behave as they do 
doesn’t necessarily explain as much as people often imagine.
Once you start to think about this—for example, what about a police department or ‘the’ 
Hispanic community (as if there’s only one)—the splits, sub-splits, and overlaps in terms 
of how people identify themselves and who they identify with should turn any wall chart 
depicting local groups and sub-groups into something akin to abstract art. This is one rea-
son some anthropologists instead prefer to focus on social relations, social structure, social 
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organization, and the division of labor. Anthropologists interested in social relations usually 
start with the smallest unit and map upward and outward from there. They pay especially 
close attention to who exchanges what with whom. By tracing whether, how, when, and 
among who power and ‘stuff ’ does or doesn’t flow they can explain how (and why) different 
groups develop different norms, customs, and world views. 
People who belong to different groups almost always have something about them that 
visibly distinguishes them from others. This is as true in California as in Kenya. Sometimes 
this is physical appearance, built into facial structure, skin color, hair type, etc.—and results 
when people marry each other more often than they marry outsiders. Other times people 
will physically permanently mark themselves as belonging to distinctive tribes via circumci-
sion, scarification, tattoos, etc. Last but not least, people might dress differently. Obviously, 
with clothes which can be put on or taken off, people can disguise their affiliation and/or 
selectively choose when to make a big deal of it. This has all sorts of implications for terror-
ism these days, but also for criminal networks.
One way to describe tribalism (my definition) is as follows: if you’re a member of my tribe 
you’re trustworthy until you prove yourself untrustworthy. If you’re not a member of my 
tribe you’re untrustworthy until you prove yourself trustworthy—and because you’re not a 
member, I’ll pay attention to everything you do, looking for reasons not to trust you. Nine 
times out of ten, what I expect to see I’ll find.
There are all sorts of ramifications when humans in groups act tribal. In some places tribes 
represent people’s only social welfare safety net; they are everything to people. Elsewhere—
as with military units—tribalism is critical to esprit, and maybe even to effectiveness. 
Here is where anthropologists who study social relations have a distinct advantage, espe-
cially when they conduct ethnographic fieldwork which involves long-term observation 
along with asking lots of people similar sets of questions. By doing so, they can triangulate. 
As mentioned previously, anthropologists purposely probe the gaps between what people 
say is important and what they treat as important. This is why, no matter how valuable it is 
to pay attention to wiring diagrams and tables of organization, which in theory should tell 
you everything you need to know, concentrating on how power actually flows and decision-
making works in reality will usually reveal all sorts of informal hierarchies and work-
arounds. This is why what a group might say and think about itself—its cultural PR—tells 
only half the story. A good anthropologist has to dig deep into the nature and substance of 
people’s actual relations with one another, too.
WHAT’S ETHNOGRAPHY?
ANNA SIMONS
Ethnography is a method of study traditionally used by anthropologists—but increasingly 
also by sociologists and other social scientists. It involves a technique called participant-
observation, which is often nothing more than living with or hanging out with the locals 
for a considerable length of time. The ideal is to be embedded long enough that the people 
being studied have no choice but to go about their daily business and ignore your presence. 
Classically, American anthropologists were expected to spend a year in the field conducting 
fieldwork. The first generation of British anthropologists thought two years was preferable. 
Length of time was considered important because usually the people being studied during 
the early to mid-1900s were tribal peoples. Ethnographers had to learn the local language 
and be able to observe people over the course of all four seasons of the year (since, in most 
cases, they were farmers or herders). 
Some anthropologists—like Peter Moskos—have gone so far as to become full-time 
participants; Moskos joined the Baltimore police force. He did so after having already been 
‘trained’ in anthropological or ethnographic techniques. Others ethnographers offer up 
their services these days to corporations in order to ‘study’ how consumers use products. 
This often means either shadowing consumers or watching them through closed circuit tv 
(presumably with their permission).
Journalists practice a variant of this. One major difference between what anthropologists 
and journalists do is journalists are supposed to transmit news and ideally answer the “who, 
what, where, when, why, and how” questions quickly, for immediate consumption by read-
ers/viewers. In contrast, good ethnographers focus as much attention on exploring what the 
answers mean as they do on ferreting out information; they don’t just transmit, they ana-
lyze. The best ethnographers also try to learn as much as possible about what has been said/
written about their study subjects—ideally, before they go to the field. If this isn’t possible, 
the ethnographer reads broadly and deeply after fieldwork or between stints of fieldwork. 
Most anthropologists would say journalists are more superficial in their approach and in 
their research than anthropologists try to be. One advantage journalists have, however, is 
that most write much more accessibly than anthropologists.
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Good ethnographers always consider the broader context: the local environment, the local 
history, the broader environment, and the broader history into which the people they’re 
studying fit. One reason it is important to be aware of what has already been said/written 
about the people or situation being studied is to be able to: a) compare your view with 
others’ view(s), b) gauge what has or hasn’t changed over time, c) verify or refute others’ 
assessments, d) identify gaps in knowledge, and e) prepare to address those gaps. 
Ideally, anthropologists should approach all situations with two research aims: to pay 
attention to what people say they do and then compare this to what they actually do. This 
is what makes fieldwork important. With fieldwork, ethnographers can probe any discrep-
ancies and, based on intimate knowledge of the locals and the situation, try to explain why 
contradictions exist and what they signify: are people consciously lying to outsiders, and 
therefore themselves? Or are they unaware that their actions belie their words? Why might 
they ignore contradictions in their own behavior? 
Because ethnographers try to look at people (and situations) from as many different angles 
and perspectives as possible, they are usually better positioned than anyone else to point out 
and explain how insiders’ (or participants’) view(s) of a situation differ from outsiders’ (or 
observers’) view(s)—and thus identify what might be needed to overcome misperceptions 
and miscommunication, especially across cultures but even within organizations. Think 
labor and management, for instance, or management and the rank and file. 
GROUP IDENTITY 
HEATHER GREGG
We all have multiple identities with which we associate. These identities range from our 
ancestral origins to our occupations to the sports teams we follow. Some identities are 
purely voluntary, like loyalty to sports teams, while others are more fixed and assigned to us, 
such as gender or race. 
This chapter considers the origins and purpose of group identity. It builds on several 
academics debates that stress the human importance of belonging to a group for a sense of 
psychological well being and for security. It also touches on the conditions under which 
identities that should be fluid become fixed, and possible ways of reversing this trend. 
Group Identity as Survival 
Group identities have an obvious social function; they give individuals a sense of place, 
purpose and direction. They are also a source of psychological comfort. As social creatures, 
we need each other. In addition to psychological functions, several scholars hypothesized 
that group identity plays a role in survival and creates the conditions under which individu-
als support and defend one another. This scholarship suggests that individuals will associate 
with groups that provide them the most security.
Describing identity as fixed and timeless gives it a sense of legitimacy. Despite this, identities 
do change and evolve over time. Moreover, individuals have multiple identities, and assert 
different identities according to different circumstances. Most scholarship agrees that group 
identity is constructed, even though it has the appearance of being fixed, and those in (and 
outside) the group describe it in terms of being timeless or given at birth. 
Several scholars argue that identity construction is a dynamic process, that it is the result 
of people and groups interacting with one another, and the need to produce a clear distinc-
tion between who is in and who is out. One scholar hypothesizes that identities become 
more fixed when groups compete over resources or power; this process “politicizes” identity, 
and when identities are politicized, they become more fixed. Other scholars contend that 
external conditions, such as the social structure in which an individual lives, are necessary 
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for understanding the conditions under which individuals emphasize a particular identity 
and experience distress when an identity is thrown into question. In other words, identities 
are dynamical in quality; they react to and are dependent upon the wider social context in 
which they are situated.
Finally, Amin Maalouf contends that when social and political contexts force individuals 
and groups to choose one identity over another, they feel threatened and react to defend 
their identity, often with violence. The solution, according to Maalouf, is never to force 
individuals or groups to prioritize and choose one identity over another.
In sum:
•	 People have multiple identities
•	 Identity has a social, psychological and security function
•	 Group identities are usually constructed, but are described as if they are inherited
•	 Competition over resources or power can lead to identities becoming more fixed
•	 When external factors throw identities into question, the result can be individual 
and group anxiety
•	 Being forced to choose one identity over another can cause groups to feel threat-
ened and respond with violence
Questions to Ask When Analyzing Identities
•	 What do individuals gain from their identity?
•	 How voluntary is their identity?
•	 What is compelling members of a group to assert that specific identity over other 
identities they have? Is it rival groups? Is it the wider society?
•	 What are groups competing over and how does this affect identity? Is it resources? 
Recruitment? Security? 
•	 What other identities do individuals have? Are there other groups that individuals 
have an option to identify with?
•	 Are there alternative identities that can be fostered through education, organiza-
tions, employment or other means that would offer a better alternative?
THE NATURE AND DISSOLUTION OF 
GROUPS
DOROTHY DENNING
People join groups. Although most of these are beneficial to the communities in which they 
are embedded, a few such as gangs and terrorist cells can be extremely harmful. To counter 
these groups, perhaps even dissolve them, it helps to understand the general characteristics 
of groups and the functions they serve for their members. While not all groups exhibit the 
characteristics described below, they are prevalent in many, including gangs.
Identity
A group has a collective identity. This identity is manifest in the group name, but also in the 
rituals, logos, colors, songs, and other symbols of the group. It is also manifest through the 
declarations and actions taken by the group. Because some group activity may be invisible to 
outsiders, a group’s internal self-identity may differ from its public identity.
The members of a group also identify with the group; that is, belonging to the group forms 
part of their self-identities. Membership in the group helps them make sense of their place 
in the world. By identifying with the group, members also identify with the beliefs, mis-
sions, actions, rituals, and symbols of the group. Participation in group rituals and other 
activities strengthens this identification and commitment to the group. 
Lure of the Group
Humans have a need to belong—to be connected to others and accepted by them. They seek 
a sense of solidarity or communion with others. They want to be part of a group and will 
sometimes suffer through difficult, painful, or even humiliating initiation rites to do so. 
They fear isolation and being left out.
Groups bring other benefits as well. They provide comfort through familiarity, safety in 
numbers, and security against threats. They provide opportunities for leadership and skill 
development, for acquiring money and other resources, and for fulfilling personal goals. 
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Being in the group can confer status, relative both to outsiders and to other group members. 
Group activities, including ones that are generally taboo such as theft and violence, can be 
an attraction for joining and bring pleasure when performed. Overall, groups are a source of 
self-esteem and general satisfaction with one’s life.
Because of the benefits of belonging, members have a stake in their group’s existence. It 
may be more important to members that their groups exist than that particular goals be 
achieved. Group members will defend their groups from external threats and develop new 
objectives and activities to ensure continued relevancy and support. 
Shared Reality
Our knowledge, beliefs, and norms are socially constructed. They are formed in conversa-
tions with others and by observing what others say and do. Because members of a group 
share information, sources, and activities, groups tend to have shared knowledge, beliefs, 
and norms. 
This general sharing of information and experiences leads to consensus and conformity of be-
lief, norms, and behavior. In addition, people conform in order to be liked and accepted by 
other group members. They will often be silent rather than risk offending others. Humans 
are especially prone towards conformity in situations of uncertainty. But even when they are 
certain, they can conform just because it feels better emotionally or they do not want to risk 
being criticized or ostracized. 
Shared beliefs coupled with consensus tend to produce groupthink. They can also lead to 
extreme and polarized beliefs relative to others. Through “one-upmanship” and reinforce-
ment, groups that start out with mildly biased views can become extremist or radical.
Us vs. Them
Groups distinguish themselves from other groups by emphasizing the similarities of their 
members and exaggerating the differences with outsiders. This is facilitated by the shared 
reality and conformity that arises in groups, and by a desire to have a distinct identity and 
stand out.
In general, group members feel their group is special and better than other groups. They view 
their group as more worthy, capable, and moral. This view allows the group to ignore the 
opinions of outsiders and reinforces the tendency toward groupthink.
Group members also have more positive assessments of people in their group than of outsid-
ers. This comes not only from feeling that the group as a whole is better, but from the close 
personal ties that members have with each other.
In an extreme case of preference for one’s own group, groups can dehumanize or demonize 
outsiders. In so doing, they justify actions that are harmful to outsiders, including acts of 
violence. They might attempt to destroy their enemies.
Trust and Influence
With groups, trust and influence are higher for insiders than outsiders. This follows from 
group similarities, shared norms, and close relationships among group members. In gen-
eral, we are more likely to trust and be influenced by those who are similar to and closely 
connected to us. In terms of network theory, influence often spreads up to three degrees of 
separation, which is likely to encompass most members of a tightly knit group. Conversely, 
group members are likely to be suspicious of outsiders, particularly those who are competi-
tors or seek their demise. 
Dissolving a Group
A group can be extremely difficult to dissolve when the attributes described above are 
prevalent. Members whose identities are wrapped up in the group may go to great lengths 
to defend the group, as threats against the group represent threats to their own identities. 
Moreover, they will likely defend the group if they are strongly attracted to it because of 
personal relationships with other members or because of other perceived benefits from 
the group. By viewing themselves as morally superior, and by dehumanizing and 
demonizing their enemies, group members can justify any and all actions against those 
who thwart them.
Still, it might be possible to reach certain members and draw them away from the group. 
Members who no longer identify with the group or care about the relationships and other 
benefits that come from the group may be willing—even anxious—to leave, especially if 
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they have other relationships and identities. But even if they lack those other connections, 
members might still be drawn away in subgroups. That way, the exiting members can con-
tinue their relationships with each other and have the benefits of belonging to the subgroup. 
This can be especially important if the old group actively works to entice them back through 
threats or new benefits. The subgroup might be brought into a larger group that offers a 
substitute identity and benefits to the exiting members, including protection from the old 
group. But without an alternative group, members who leave a group will likely return to 
satisfy their human need for relationship, identity, and other group benefits.
Reaching people within a group can be difficult, as they may be suspicious of or even an-
tagonistic towards outsiders. To facilitate contact, members can be reached through outsid-
ers they trust. These may be former group members, friends, family members, or others who 
can serve as trusted intermediaries between current members and community leaders trying 
to dissolve the group.
In addition to drawing current members away from a group, efforts can be made to keep 
new people from joining, for example by offering alternative groups to serve their need 
for connection and identity. Without new members, a group will eventually dissolve on 
its own. Further, the lack of new members might make the group less attractive to current 
members, facilitating their own exit from the group as they become disillusioned with the 
long-term prospects of the group.
ENGAGING SOCIETY TO COUNTER 
VIOLENT GROUPS 
HEATHER GREGG
In 2008, concerned citizens of the republic of Colombia organized a series of national 
rallies aimed at showing popular discontent for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombian (FARC), one of the oldest insurgent movements in Latin America. Colombian 
pop singer Shakira and recently freed FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt headed the protests 
with the slogan: “United for Life and Liberty.” A rally held on July 20, 2008 drew an 
estimated 5 million citizens into the streets to show support for the Colombian government 
and condemnation for FARC. Similar protests were held around the world, mobilizing 
Colombian expatriates and other concerned citizens. The rallies were a visible display of 
national solidarity against the insurgent movement and a means of mobilizing and unifying 
the country against this threat. 
This chapter considers how social movements are formed to counter violent groups. The 
chapter begins with a brief description of Social Movement Theory (SMT), which hypoth-
esizes how grievances can be transformed into social action. The chapter then focuses on 
the “framing” of the problem—how it is described—as a means of mobilizing, the political 
climate, and resources that are useful for creating effective social movements.
Social Movement Theory
SMT seeks to explain the conditions under which social and political grievances, which 
exist in all societies, transform into organized social movements that work towards specific 
change. SMT posits that three conditions or “variables” create social movements: the 
political environment, resources, and “framing,” or how the grievance and the solution are 
described. 
The political environment considers things like the ability of groups to freely assemble and 
protest; the nature of the country’s or city’s government (democracy, dictatorship, failed 
state, etc); and the political environment’s openness to negotiation and change.
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Resources include the types of organizations that exist outside the government and their 
leaders (i.e., grass roots organizations, churches and religions, labor unions, etc.) and the 
material resources available to groups and society, such as money, communications infra-
structure, and social networks. 
Finally, “framing,” considers how the problem and the solution are depicted. Framing 
includes the use of culture and symbols that have meaning to the population and work to 
bring people and groups together and unify them behind the cause. Critical to framing in 
social movements is the belief that change is possible, and participation in the movement 
will help bring about that change.
Fostering a Social Movement
Drawing from the above discussion, below are some general observations on fostering social 
movement to counter violent groups.
Framing
Framing is perhaps the most important variable to consider in creating a social movement 
against violent groups.
In order to mobilize the population, the problem needs to be framed in a way that makes 
the solution the responsibility and needed participation of the entire population. In other 
words, the population needs to be empowered; it needs to believe that that the problem is 
solvable and it can make a difference. 
Leaders—including government officials, clergy, and prominent citizens—can shape the 
framing or the problem and the solution through dialogue with the community, both 
formal and informal, and through public speeches, ad campaigns, and empowering local 
organizations and leaders. 
When framing the problem and the solution, it is important that leaders find symbols and 
language that unify the entire population, not just one group. For example, in Colombia, 
celebrities and ex-combatants united around a common slogan—“for life and liberty”—and 
called on the entire country to physically show their support for the government and their 
condemnation for FARC. The message and the rallies became tangible unity against violent 
groups.
Political Environment
In many cases, the political environment is the greatest challenge to creating a social move-
ment aimed at countering violent groups. In democracies, the government is an elected 
body and is bound by popular support. Reelection requires popular support in the form of 
votes. In areas with violent groups, the success—or failure—of the government can hinge 
on its ability to counter the violence; however, it is unlikely that the problem can be tackled 
within one administration’s term. 
The problem of election cycles suggests that, for continuity beyond one administration’s 
term, civic organizations (organizations that exist independent of the government) should 
be empowered to fight violent groups. Pushing the problem down to these organizations 
both empowers the community and utilizes preexisting organizations that already have 
momentum (see below). 
Resources
Empowering the population to counter violent groups requires resources. Money is im-
portant, but not the only resource necessary for creating a social movement. Perhaps more 
important for mobilization are civic organizations and leaders. 
Effective social movements build off of preexisting organizations, utilizing their existing 
networks, reputations, and resources. 




•	 Sports teams 
•	 Social clubs
•	 Parent groups like the PTA
Organizations and networks alone, however, may not be sufficient for mobilizing the popu-
lation for a specific purpose. In most successful social movements, a charismatic leader has 
provided the direction and inspiration necessary for coordinating various groups and foster-
ing mass mobilization. For example, the civil rights movement had Martin Luther King, Jr., 
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the United Farm Workers’ movement had Cesar Chavez, and the Colombian protests had a 
pop icon, Shakira, and Ingrid Betancourt to raise awareness and rally support. 
Some examples of potential leaders that could unify groups and foster mass mobilization 
include:
•	 Religious leaders
•	 Athletes that have become professional players or are local heroes
•	 Former violent group members that have renounced violence (or former group 
leaders).
THE YOUNG MALE PROBLEM
ANNA SIMONS
Young males are biologically wired to be disruptive. According to Lionel Tiger, who is a 
pioneer in the field, their bad behavior is a fact of social existence. What most traditional 
societies used to do was accept this fact, work with it, and work with young males to 
socialize them into being responsible members of their society, and disruptive only to 
members of other societies. The most successful of these methods always included formal 
(and often lengthy) rites of passage. Typically, young males were initiated out of childhood 
into warriorhood or an apprenticeship of some sort, and then, eventually, into adulthood. 
Roles and responsibilities changed with each shift—and everyone in the society knew what 
to expect of males at each stage. 
For the most part, American society has lost any meaningful society-wide gates into or out 
of male adolescence. 
To be sure, one means of channeling (and maturing) male adolescents in modern societ-
ies has been via the military. But not all young men go into the military. Universities and 
monasteries have been two other institutions that have historically been used in the West 
to address the ‘young male’ problem, though clearly neither will work for males who don’t 
go to college or who don’t enter the priesthood. Sports may sometimes fill this void—but 
with sports ‘role models’ behaving like adolescents, it is not clear that sports today are quite 
the path to rectitude and responsibility they once were. Nonetheless, like the military, team 
sports answer at least some of the mail. 
There are several things young males need to be able to do during adolescence. All involve 
status. Young males need to test their limits—this includes against each other and against 
their elders. They need to show off—to each other, to elders, and to females. Most impor-
tant perhaps, and as a means to these other ends, they need to be able to earn and defend 
their place in a pecking order constituted of their peers. 
While young men need to do much of their sorting out among their peers—making it criti-
cally important that societies provide venues in which they can do this without jeopardizing 
the peace—they are also performing for at least two additional audiences: elders, and young 
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girls. Elders were important in traditional societies because they held the keys to marriage 
and the future. The goal of all males was to become head of a household one day, which 
meant young males had to prove themselves acceptable as potential sons-in-law. The fact 
that so many young males so many places today do not see a future in which they’ll be able 
to make ends meet, let alone attain a wife and support a family, is one important source of 
frustration in the Middle East, Africa, etc. 
Interestingly, young males in the U.S. don’t exactly face these kinds of problems. Money is 
easier to acquire—via credit, crime, or state assistance; many male ‘elders’ are AWOL so 
they’re no kind of check on bad behavior; and young men who father children and continue 
to act irresponsibly remain able to attract women—something that was never the case in 
traditional societies (and still isn’t the case many other places). 
In the absence of elders as a sufficient check on disruptive behavior, the ways in which young 
women reward young men, and which young men they favor, takes on added significance. 
Biological anthropologists often explain human behavior in terms of male-male competi-
tion and female choice; in their view this is what drives natural selection. Or, as most guys 
might put it: no woman ever needs to leave a bar alone if she doesn’t want to, but too often 
guys do. This means women have more power than males want to publicly admit—even if 
the power they have they cede to alpha males.
There are lots of perspectives from which to consider male adolescence—and to think about 
what males seek and thereby need to be able to find and/or prove: a sense of purpose, a 
group to belong to, a measure of their worth, etc. But status seems as good a way as any to 
summarize all this, especially since what counts as status is always going to depend. It will 
depend on who the audiences are, what audiences expect to see, what is considered ‘cool,’ 
provocative, dangerous, and daring, etc. 
Clearly, young males who excel at playing by society’s rules will try to best each other ac-
cording to these rules, and they’ll do so openly. Maybe the competition involves who’s best 
at finding game or coming home from war with trophies, both of which societies in the past 
regarded as promise of future success. But in a country like ours, that prizes diversity, one 
size can’t fit all; we’re not some small-scale tribal society (though even most tribes offered 
different venues for young men as they tried to figure out who could lead and who should 
follow). Being such a heterogeneous country will always complicate the issue of whose game 
young males choose to play and whose rules they want to follow, which is one reason groups 
and gangs compete: to determine this.
Alternatively, consider the movie Fight Club. It clearly struck a chord. Why? Because for 
some young men there is no more potent combination than illicitness and violence, while 
for other young men excelling at illicitness and violence is better still, while for yet others 
organizing, orchestrating, and prevailing at organizing and orchestrating illicitness and 
violence is best of all. Nor do young women necessarily disagree. Again, the paradox young 
women present is that what many, if not most, are looking for (whether they articulate it 
this way or not) is a young male who can take charge.
Society’s challenge thus becomes how to set parameters for competition(s) that enable 
young males with the most disruptive potential to outdo each other and impress young 
women without this subverting the social order. These venues not only have to permit the 
strongest, smartest, fastest males to win, but if not and if the decks are stacked against them, 
these are individuals who will then commit themselves to defiance, not compliance. The 
more defiant males there are, meanwhile, the more violent and spectacular their competi-
tion over status and attracting followers becomes—a cycle, once entered, that becomes 
increasingly difficult to break. 
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BEST PRACTICES IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY
KALEV SEPP
ADAPTED FROM MILITARY REVIEW, MAY-JUNE 2005
We can discern “best practices” common to successful counterinsurgencies by studying the 
past century’s insurgent wars. The U.S. Government defines insurgency as the organized use 
of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge the political control of a region. 
Counterinsurgency is the comprehensive civil and military efforts taken to simultaneously 
defeat an insurgency and address its root causes. Historical analysis helps us understand 
the nature and continuities of insurgencies over time and in various cultural, political, and 
geographic settings. While this does not produce a template solution to civil wars and 
insurrections, the sum of these experiences, judiciously and appropriately applied, suggests 
practices a government could employ against an insurgency.
Assessment reveals which counterinsurgency practices were successful and which failed. A 
strategic victory does not validate all the victor’s operational and tactical methods or make 
them universally applicable, as America’s defeat in Vietnam and its success in El Salvador 
demonstrate. In both cases, “learning more from one’s mistakes than one’s achievements” is 
a valid axiom. If we were to combine all the successful operational practices from a century 
of counterinsurgent warfare, the summary would suggest a campaign guide to conduct a 
counterinsurgency (see table, next page).
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Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices
Successful
•	 Focus on population, their needs, and 
security.
•	 Emphasis on intelligence.
•	 Secure areas established, expanded.
•	 Insurgents isolated from population (popu-
lation control).
•	 Single authority (charismatic/dynamic 
leader).
•	 Effective, pervasive psychological opera-
tions (PSYOP) campaigns.
•	 Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents.
•	 Police in lead; military supporting.
•	 Police force expanded, diversified.
•	 Conventional military forces reoriented for 
counterinsurgency.
•	 Special Forces, advisers embedded with 
indigenous forces.
•	 Insurgent sanctuaries denied.
Unsuccessful
•	 Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, 
not on engaging population.
•	 Primacy of military direction of 
counterinsurgency.
•	 Battalion-size operations as the 
norm.
•	 Military units concentrated on 
large bases for protection.
•	 Special Forces focused on 
raiding.
•	 Adviser effort a low priority in 
personnel assignment.
•	 Building, training indigenous 
army in image of U.S. Army.
•	 Peacetime government 
processes.
•	 Open borders, airspace, 
coastlines.
The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in 
any conflict— the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government. 
Winning their hearts and minds must be the objective of the government’s efforts. Because 
this is a policy objective, it must be directed by the country’s political leaders.
Human rights 
The security of the people must be assured as a basic need, along with food, water, shelter, 
health care, and a means of living. These are human rights, along with freedom of worship, 
access to education, and equal rights for women. The failure of counterinsurgencies and the 
root cause of the insurgencies themselves can often be traced to government disregard of 
these basic rights, as in Kuomintung, China; French Indochina; Batista’s Cuba; Somoza’s 
Nicaragua; and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, among others. Recognition and assurance 
of these rights by the government has been essential to turning a population away from 
insurgents and their promises.
During the 1950s Malaya Emergency, British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer—a 
declared anti-racist—strived for political and social equality of all Malays. He granted 
Malay citizenship en masse to over a million Indians and Chinese; required Britons to reg-
ister as Malay citizens; elevated the public role of women; constructed schools, clinics, and 
police stations; electrified rural villages; continued a 700-percent increase in the number of 
police and military troops; and gave arms to militia guards to protect their own communi-
ties. In this environment, insurgent terrorism only drove the people further from the rebels 
and closer to the government.
Law enforcement 
Intelligence operations that help detect terrorist insurgents for arrest and prosecution are 
the single most important practice to protect a population from threats to its security. Hon-
est, trained, robust police forces responsible for security can gather intelligence at the com-
munity level. Historically, robustness in wartime requires a ratio of 20 police and auxiliaries 
for each 1,000 civilians. In turn, an incorrupt, functioning judiciary must support the police.
Population control 
Insurgents rely on members of the population for concealment, sustenance, and recruits, 
so they must be isolated from the people by all means possible. Among the most effective 
means are such population-control measures as vehicle and personnel checkpoints and 
national identity cards. In Malaya, the requirement to carry an I.D. card with a photo and 
thumbprint forced the communists to abandon their original three-phase political-military 
strategy and caused divisive infighting among their leaders over how to respond to this 
effective population-control measure.
Political process 
Informational campaigns explain to the population what they can do to help their govern-
ment make them secure from terrorist insurgents; encourage participation in the political 
process by voting in local and national elections; and convince insurgents they can best 
meet their personal interests and avoid the risk of imprisonment or death by reintegrating 
themselves into the population through amnesty, rehabilitation, or by simply not fighting. 
The Philippine Government’s psychological warfare branch was able to focus its messages 
on individual villages and specific Huk guerrilla bands because it employed locals and sur-
rendered insurgents on its staffs.
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Security 
After the police and supporting forces secure a neighborhood, village, township, or infra-
structure facility from terrorist insurgent activity, the government can apply resources to 
expand the secure area to an adjacent zone and expand the secure area again when that zone 
is completely secure. In Malaya, the government designated secure, contested, and enemy 
zones by white, gray, and black colors (a technique that mirrored that of the rebels) and 
promised rewards of services and aid to persons who helped purge an area of insurgents. 
Attaining the status of a secure “white zone,” with the attendant government benefits, was 
in the people’s best interest.
Counterinsurgent warfare 
Constant patrolling by government forces establishes an official presence that enhances 
security and builds confidence in the government. Patrolling is a basic tenet of policing, 
and in the last 100 years all successful counterinsurgencies have employed this fundamental 
security practice. Other more creative methods also have been used against insurgents, such 
as the infiltration of Mau Mau gangs in Kenya by British-trained “pseudo-gangs” posing as 
collaborators, a tactic also employed by the Filipino “Force X” against Huk guerrillas.
Executive authority 
Emergency conditions dictate that a government needs a single, fully empowered executive 
to direct and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts. Power-sharing among political bodies, 
while appropriate and necessary in peacetime, presents wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in 
coordination that insurgents can exploit. For example, one person—a civil servant with the 
rank of secretary of state—is responsible for all British Government political and military 
activity in Northern Ireland. In another example, in 1992, when Peru was on the verge of 
falling to the Shining Path insurgents, newly elected President Alberto Fujimori gave him-
self exceptional executive authority to fight terrorists. With overwhelming popular support, 
Fujimori unified the counterinsurgency effort and within three years wiped out the Maoists. 
In 1997, he crushed another violent insurgent group.
The requirement for exceptional leadership during an internal war calls for a dynamic leader with 
energy, commitment and imagination. To ensure long-term success, this leader must remain in 




According to the U.S. Field Manual 5-0, “The military decision-making process is a planning 
methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and other partners to 
understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on 
a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or 
order of execution.” Additionally, this process follows a basic template that may be used to 
satisfy similar civilian decision-making requirements. While the MDMP is only one method 
to conduct planning, it is nonetheless, a time proven method that is easy to implement, 
synthesize and excellent in accommodating multiple and diverse units, departments, agencies 
and other groups. 
Conceptually, the MDMP is a multi-step process in which each step produces a number of out-
puts. These outputs are subsequently used as inputs for the next step in the process. The following 
visually depicts the MDMP process and summarizes the essential outputs for each step: 
Reference: Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process
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In order to fully understand the MDMP, the following detailed explanation of each step is 
provided below: 
1. Receipt of Mission
Leaders should commence the MDMP immediately upon receiving or anticipating a mis-
sion or tasking. The primary purpose of the first step in the MDMP is to notify personnel of 
the pending mission or tasking. This should be delivered to as many personnel as possible, 
in order to ensure all individuals understand the priority of efforts. Additionally, leaders will 
need to outline the planning expectations. After using the MDMP over a period of time, 
the process will become common knowledge and should be incorporated into the unit’s 
Standard Operating Procedures. At this time, leaders should also designate key personnel 
for specific roles during the MDMP, in order to establish a focused effort. Finally, an initial 
timeline should be disseminated to all personnel. This allows individuals to manage their 
time appropriately and establishes a driving element for the entire process. 
2. Mission Analysis
This step in the MDMP is perhaps the most important, due to the need to establish an 
accurate foundation for subsequent steps. This solid underpinning can be achieved through 
the creation of a clear and concise Mission Statement. The Mission Statement should ad-
dress the following: 
a. Who will be conducting the mission? (Specific sub-units tasked)
b. When will they be conducting the mission? (Start and end times/dates)
c. Where will they be conducting the mission? (Location of the objective)
d. Why they will be conducting the mission? (Leaders intended endstate)
e. How will they be conducting the mission? (General method being applied)
Additionally, delineating the required tasks that support the mission is a vital part of the 
Mission Analysis step. MDMP breaks down these tasks into the following three categories, 
according to the Field Manual: 
a.  Specified Tasks: tasks that are specifically assigned to a unit by higher headquarters. 
Generally, these tasks tend to be broad in scope. However, further analysis of 
higher headquarters’ intent can produce greater clarity on the expectations and 
better define the specific tasks. 
b.  Implied Tasks: tasks that must be performed in order to accomplish a specified 
task. Additionally, common tasks outside of supporting specified tasks should also 
be identified. This will enable the unit to ensure a comprehensive list of actions that 
need to be taken to meet mission success. 
c.  Essential Tasks: tasks that must be performed in order to successfully accomplish 
the leader’s purpose and the mission. These tasks can be either specified or implied 
tasks. Essentially, delineating these tasks allow for staff members to ensure priority 
of efforts and mission focus. 
In addition to delineating tasks, planning personnel must identify constraints and limita-
tions. Constraints are defined as a requirement placed on the unit by higher and dictates an 
action or non-action. Limitations are identified as the internal factors that limit the unit’s 
actions based on capabilities or resources. 
Finally, planners must begin to establish a list of current facts they know regarding the 
situation. They must also separate out their assumptions. Throughout the MDMP, plan-
ners will endeavor to change their assumptions into facts through researched information. 
This action of confirming or denying assumptions is the engine of the MDMP process. The 
less assumptions during the planning process, the more accurate the unit’s recommended 
Course of Action (COA) will be. 
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3. Course of Action Development
During this step, planners utilize all of the previous outputs to develop a proposed COA. 
Traditionally, for a military operation a COA would consist of the following phases: (1) 
Preparation, (2) Insertion, (3) Infiltration, (4) Actions on the Objective, (5) Exfiltration, 
(6) Extraction, and (7) Debrief and follow on mission preparation. Obviously, these phases 
may need to be altered to better fit the specific environment or mission. However, the 
general concept of a progressive, phased plan transcends all COAs. At a minimum, COAs 
should include the following: 
a. The Mission Statement
b. Leader’s intent
c. A Phased plan that includes (by phase): 
•	 Each sub-unit’s specific actions 
•	 Resource allocations 
•	 Contingency considerations/solutions
•	 A graphic depiction if applicable
Generally, three COAs are developed for proposal. This provides a diverse approach to 
planning and allows the leader to consider different options. It is recommended that plan-
ners split into groups for the initial development of COAs. This allows for alternative per-
spectives to surface. Once again, planners should update any facts that have been discovered 
during their research of assumptions. 
4. Course of Action Analysis
This step should be focused on the unbiased review of each COA. It is important to re-
member that during COA analysis, each COA is analyzed independent of the other COAs 
in order to ensure it can stand on its own merit. According to the Field Manual, planners 
should objectively analyze the following perspectives about each COA: 
a. Suitability: Does the COA fit within the Mission Statement and the leader’s intent?
b. Feasibility: Can the COA be completed within the established time, space, and 
resource limitations?
c. Acceptability: Does the COA balance risk versus reward?
d. Distinguishable: Does the COA differ significantly from other COAs?
e. Completeness: Does the COA satisfy all the minimum requirements? 
Additionally, planners may engage in “war gaming” each COA. This will inevitably lead 
to identifying any shortfalls and additional ways to improve each COA. This step should 
conclude with the completion of three comprehensive COAs. 
5. Course of Action Comparison
Different than the individual COA analysis conducted in the previous step, this step 
attempts to qualitatively compare the COAs collectively. First, planners must determine a 
method of comparison. The most common method of comparison is rating each COA by 
varying advantageous factors. For a military operation, such factors may consist of speed, 
stealth, and safety. Essentially, the factors should represent beneficial qualities that would 
exist for the perfect plan. Once these factors have been identified, a comparison matrix 
can be developed. The following is a basic example using an ordingal rating of 1–5, with 5 
representing the most advantageous.
COA#1 COA#2 COA#3
Speed 1 5 4
Stealth 5 2 4
Safety 3 1 2
Total 9 8 10
Additionally, planners can inject the leader’s guidance during the comparison process by 
inserting weighted values to each factor. In other words, the leader can assign a value to each 
factor by his prioritization. The following is another example of a comparison matrix with 
weighted values based on the leader’s input, with safety being the leader’s primary concern.
COA#1 COA#2 COA#3
Speed 1 × 1 = 1 5 × 1 = 5 4 × 1 = 4
Stealth 5 × 2 = 10 2 × 2 = 4 4 × 2 =8
Safety 3 × 3 = 9 1 × 3 = 3 2 × 3 = 6
Total 20 12 18
As a result of injecting the leader’s prioritization the total value for each COA has changed 
and consequently so has the preferred COA.
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6. Course of Action Approval
This step should consist of a briefing of each proposed COA to the leader. Additionally, 
planners should have attempted to eliminate all assumptions by this phase. However, if any 
do remain, they should be disclosed to the leader at this time. Furthermore, any risks and 
the associated plans to mitigate those risks should be briefed to the leader with every COA. 
Planners should also discuss their COA comparison matrix to demonstrate the integration 
of the leader’s intent as well as show the objective comparison of each COA. 
Finally, the decision to select a COA rests with the leader. Considering the thorough 
process the planners have undergone to develop the COAs, the leader will likely have all 
the information he or she will need to decide. Occasionally, the leader may need additional 
information that will impact the recommended COAs. In this case, planners will have to 
revisit steps 4–6. Otherwise, the leader should select a COA and planners and administra-
tors should move on to the final step in MDMP. 
7. Orders Production
This final step of the MDMP will consist of the administrative translation of the selected 
COA into action orders for the unit and sub-units to execute. Additionally, units should 
consider any branching or sequential plans that may be effected by or generated from this 
COA selection. Finally, this step is a good time for the leader to disseminate his final guid-
ance. Personnel will inevitably begin taking action on the selected COA immediately and 
the leader will want to use this last opportunity to ensure everyone is acting under the right 
intent and focused towards the mission’s success. 
In summary, the MDMP should be treated as a tool to guide and stimulate decision-mak-
ing. The MDMP allows planners to methodically collect, merge, and analyze key pieces of 
information. Subsequently, the MDMP will assist planners to objectively develop, compare, 
and propose valid courses of action based on that information. Ultimately, the leader must 
make the decision. However, with the MDMP, leaders can be confident in the COAs 
recommended by his staff and the unit will increase its chances of mission success. 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
HY ROTHSTEIN
Strategic Communication is a comparatively new term. For use in this document strategic 
communication is defined as:
A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted at all socio-economic 
levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective communications 
channels, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those channels to promote 
and sustain specific types of behavior within the target audience. 
To some extent, Strategic Communication can be thought of as being analogous to an 
orchestra. The orchestra’s conductor is the government, the musical score is the Strategic 
Communication plan and the orchestra itself the various government agencies. The music 
is the narrative. Depending on the effect you seek to achieve, different sections of the 
orchestra will be used at different times, or with different emphasis. 
What Strategic Communication is Not 
Strategic Communication is not simply media interaction. Neither is it simply a new term 
for Public Relations. Such thinking actually limits the power of strategic communication to 
support campaigns by over-simplifying its range and activities. Strategic communication is 
neither advertising nor marketing. While there is some correlation between the art of com-
mercial persuasion and Strategic Communication, the latter has to be far more sophisticated 
in its identification of both audience and message. Additionally, Strategic Communication 
must penetrate deeply to affect how someone views substantive issues and is protracted, 
rather than the superficial, short term effects necessary for commercial advertising. Strategic 
Communications requires a dialog while advertising is one way communications. Strategic 
Communication has to presume that audiences process and interpret messages and provide 
feedback whereas advertisers can assume an audience that is relatively passive. Neither are the 
consequences of failed commercial advertising as serious as failed Strategic Communica-
tion. One less car sale may be a financial disappointment but the real world consequences of 
getting a Strategic Communication message wrong, of alienating an audience and possibly 
provoking them into violent action, far outweigh the largely financial risks of commercial 
advertising. 
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Understanding How to Communicate with Audiences 
Strategic Communication can be successful if practitioners understand the basic principle 
of communication. The simplest model of communication is the “message influence model.” 
This model suggests that a source with ideas, intentions and information translates them 
into a message, which is transmitted via a channel to a receiver or audience. The purpose 
of the process is to influence the receiver to understand the message in the same way as 
the source and to subsequently act in a specific manner. This is a highly simplistic model 
which assumes no outside interference. A key underlying assumption of this model is that 
the process of communicating the message to the audience will be successful unless there is 
some interference in the transmission, which does not always reflect reality.
Narratives 
An important component in ensuring the coherence of governmental communication 
themes within the campaign is the narrative. Narratives may be defined as: A thematic and 
sequenced account that conveys meaning from authors to audiences about specific events. Nar-
ratives are not merely a set of words but a more holistic idea sweeping up not just the entire 
body of texts and speeches dealing with a specific event but all the supporting symbolism 
and imagery. Narratives are the foundation of all strategy. They are the organizing frame-
work for policy and the definitive reference for how events are to be argued and described. 
Their purpose is to bind together all of the actions of the government and their representa-
tives under a common understanding. Narratives should provide structure and relevance 
to the meaning of a particular situation and messaging should never be disconnected from 
the over-arching narrative stream. They can be difficult to create since they must have utility 
for all relevant parties. And it is important to remember that there is invariably a counter-
narrative which is also competing for attention and resonance. The best and most successful 
narratives are those which embrace ideas and terminology that quickly gain resonance or 
‘stickiness’ with intended audiences. Leaders must therefore have an unambiguous under-
standing of the narrative that accompanies their activities, and the role they have in either 
supporting that narrative through their words and actions. 
Target Audience Analysis
Understanding the prospective audience is a sine qua non of the Strategic Communica-
tion process. This preparatory phase, which is referred to as Target Audience Analysis, is a 
highly complex process for which most organizations may be ill-equipped. Target Audience 
Analysis has six component parts: 
1.  Strategic Campaign Planning. This involves the clarification of the objectives, the 
initial research and analysis of the population, its constituent groups, and their 
relationship to the problem. It is the process of identifying which behavior needs 
to change in which group to yield results that measurably contribute to achieving 
the strategic objectives. Additionally, it is at this stage that one begins to identify 
specific baseline measures of effectiveness (MOE). 
2.  Target Audience Identification. One group, out of many, is selected as the most 
accessible, amenable to influence, and most closely related to the survival of the 
non desired behavior. It is towards this audience that the strategic communication 
campaign will be focused. To be sure, reinforcing desirable behavior in selected 
target audiences can also be a function of Strategic Communication.
3.  Target Audience Analysis. This is the deep analysis of the identified target audi-
ence—those that we believe can affect change—using quantitative and qualita-
tive measures - to develop an intimate understanding of the audience’s various 
characteristics. 
4.  Campaign Design. This stage involves the construction of the message. The 
campaign design stage specifies the breadth and size of a campaign. It identifies the 
proper design of a campaign as it pertains to that campaign’s channels, sources and, 
importantly, messages. 
5.  Campaign Execution. The campaign execution stage benefits from the previous 
stages of analysis, development and design, and involves executing the campaign 
through the appropriate channel, with the appropriate source, using the correct 
message. 
6.  Evaluation. Following, and during, execution of the campaign is the evaluation 
which involves assessment of the effectiveness of the campaign as a whole in bring-
ing about the desired change in behavior on the part of the target audience. 
Target Channel Analysis 
Target Channel Analysis is the evaluation and utilization of trusted and credible transmis-
sion conduits, ones that carry resonance with the intended audience, for the transmission of 
messages. Channels can be traditional media (newspapers, TV, radio), emerging media (the 
internet, blogs, text messaging), or other communication mechanisms (such as individuals 
with particular credibility in specific communities). The last ten years has seen a remarkable 
growth in the range of global information sources and the personal use of social media sites, 
such as YouTube and Facebook, which enjoy enormous popularity, becoming important 
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and believable news and opinion formers. There is a danger that this new media—often 
referred to as social or digital media - is viewed as a leisure activity and not an avenue for 
telling a story or communicating with audiences. Underestimating the power of social and 
digital media is unhelpful. At the same time, one should not overlook the great importance 
of age old channels such as face-to-face meetings between and among key persons. Network 
media should also generate a note of caution, for lax oversight can render invaluable as-
sistance to adversaries and their supporters. 
Measurements 
Throughout the Strategic Communication process measurements must be taken. Measure-
ments of effectiveness (MOE) can be defined as: the differences from a given system state to a 
desired end state. 
In recent years polling has become increasingly useful in the determination of attitudes 
and, subsequently, to the formulation of policy. This is because polling is perceived as being 
the easiest technique for accessing audience information and as a consequence an entire 
industry has grown up to support its use. While polling is useful it should not be considered 
perfect. For example, in certain population groups the expression of a personal opinion may 
be dangerous. Furthermore, some accede to the views of group leaders. Accordingly, the 
results of polls should be viewed with a degree of suspicion. Finally, poll results can change 
very quickly and therefore should not be indicative of the future—particularly in highly 
dynamic environments. 
It is necessary therefore to develop more nuanced measurements of effectiveness, which 
may often be very local in nature. Although examples of past MOE can be helpful, doctrine 
must not be too prescriptive since MOE must emerge from the communication process and 
be focused upon the specific audience. Ultimately, it must start with a baseline measure-
ment—the audience’s behavior (or attitude) before the strategic communication process 
and then again afterwards—how long afterwards itself being an important consideration. 
Measurements through Time 
Strategic Communication is time sensitive. The presumption is that a strategic communica-
tion campaign will permanently alter behavior; however empirical evidence shows that mes-
sages normally decay over time. Accordingly, the need to consider the time period in which 
communications are designed and, what, if any, follow-on campaigns will be needed is key. 
TRUST AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT
DOROTHY DENNING
Many communities face problems such as crime, gangs, and poverty that cannot be 
solved without the support of the people living in the community. To get that support, 
government officials need the peoples’ trust. If the population does not trust their officials, 
they will not fully cooperate with them. They will not voluntarily attend meetings or 
get behind programs designed to address a problem. They will not accept and act on 
information they receive, and they will not be forthcoming with information they have. 
Nature of Trust
Trust is based on expectations. A community trusts its leaders when they believe their lead-
ers will meet their expectations. These expectations fall into roughly three areas: capability, 
integrity, and benevolence. Expectations in the area of capability pertain to task perfor-
mance—getting a job done and done well. Examples are providing community services 
such as police, fire, education, and garbage collection. Expectations in the area of integrity 
pertain to ethics and morals—being honest, fair, consistent, principled, and so forth. 
Examples are telling the truth, keeping promises, addressing grievances, and ensuring justice. 
Finally, expectations in the area of benevolence pertain to intent—caring about the people 
in the community as demonstrated by action. Examples include making sure that people do 
not fall through the cracks and helping victims of crime and abuse.
The belief that someone holds about whether another person, the trustee, will meet their 
expectations is grounded in part by the trustee’s appearance, performance, and reputation. 
Appearance includes such characteristics as facial features and expression, clothes, body 
language, race, sex, age, and ethnicity. It is perhaps the most important factor, especially 
initially when there may be little or no information about performance or reputation. Al-
though trust based on appearance is tied to roles—we do not expect or want a police officer 
to act or look like a doctor—we are also more inclined to trust those who look like us than 
those who do not. In general, it can be harder to gain trust from persons of a different race 
or ethnicity than from persons of our own.
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Performance relates to direct observation of the trustee’s actions—seeing the person dem-
onstrate capability, integrity, and benevolence. This is where the old phrase “actions speak 
louder than words” comes in. If someone fails to deliver on a promise or says they care about 
you while taking actions that are considered harmful, that person will not be trusted. 
Reputation relates to the trustee’s record of past deeds. These are conveyed through resumes, 
credentials, titles, letters of recommendation, word of mouth, and so forth. Whether the 
reports are true matters less than whether they are believed. Moreover, people have been 
swayed by false gossip even when their own observations contradicted the rumors.
Trust is also grounded in contextual factors, including accountability and setting. Account-
ability facilitates trust by ensuring that trustees who fail to meet certain expectations are 
held accountable for misdeeds. The setting can either facilitate or inhibit trust. Situations 
where a police officer stops a motorist or enters someone’s home, for example, are mired in 
mutual suspicion.
While the above might suggest a rational approach to trust, in fact, trust is often irrational. 
Indeed, trust may be determined in less than a tenth of a second based on appearances 
alone. In those situations, trust is determined in the “emotional” part of the brain rather 
than the “reasoning” part. 
Trust can be granted to an individual or group. Moreover, trust (or distrust) in an individual 
often extends to the person’s groups and vice-versa. For example, if an individual police of-
ficer is distrusted, then all police officers may be distrusted, while if the police are generally 
distrusted, then a particular officer will be distrusted.
Building Trust
There are several actions that government officials can take to build trust with their 
community:
Show respect and trust. One of the benefits of trust is that the act of granting it evokes a 
reciprocation of trust; that is, trust begets trust. Thus, by trusting community members, 
government officials can foster reciprocal trust from the community. Some actions that 
show respect and extend trust include: listening; meeting with people in their neighbor-
hoods; seeking advice and suggestions, and then following at least some of them; giving 
people the authorities and resources to carry out community projects; treating people fairly 
and with dignity; being responsive to needs and interests; conceding points; and sharing 
information. Respect should be extended towards everyone, even those who may be part of 
the problem.
Clarify expectations. Because trust is based on a belief that expectations will be fulfilled, 
it is critical that community members have realistic expectations about what government 
officials can and will do, not only with respect to the problem at hand, but in all areas. 
Otherwise, they may harbor expectations that cannot be fulfilled, thereby setting up a situ-
ation where trust is impossible. One of the obstacles that Coalition forces faced in Iraq was 
a disconnect on expectations: while the Coalition emphasized the virtues of freedom and 
getting rid of Saddam’s regime, the Iraqis expected electricity, water, food, jobs, safety, and 
other essential services.
Keep promises and deliver results. A sure way of losing trust is to fail to keep promises or de-
liver results. Thus, it is critical that promises be fulfilled, commitments kept, and outcomes 
achieved. If circumstances make this impossible, it is necessary to acknowledge the failure 
and clarify what can be done instead.
Be truthful, open, and accountable. Transparency and accountability foster trust. Thus, it 
is important to keep community members informed of policies, plans and operations. 
Government officials also should own up to mistakes, hold people accountable, and right 
wrongs. It is important to always tell the truth and not cover up failures. 
Use trusted intermediaries. It is best to reach community members through government of-
ficials they already trust or even non-officials they know and trust. This may vary from one 
segment of the population to another. Trusted intermediaries can help build trust between 
government and the population.
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POPULATION CONTROL
BRIAN GREENSHIELDS
In counterinsurgency campaigns, one of the critical tasks is to separate insurgents from the 
general population. One set of tools that can be used to do so is called Population Resource 
Control Measures (PCRMs), which are discussed in the US Army’s counterinsurgency 
(COIN) manual (Field Manual 3-24). These measures aim to 1) protect people from 
insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals (because until the population feels secure, 
they will not overtly risk supporting COIN efforts), and 2) help establish firm government 
presence and control over the local area and populace. PRCMs encompass a wide set of 
activities conducted to control the populace and to deny designated material resources to 
the insurgents. According to the work of Vance Klosinski, PRCMs run the gamut from 
placing physical barriers to segregate a population; to checkpoints; to extended pass systems 
to control local travel; to curfews; to population relocation measures; to conducting a 
census; to gathering biometric data/establishment of National ID cards; and much more. 
PRCMs are designed to build a wedge between the population and the insurgents… to 
isolate them physically and psychologically. In regards to local law enforcement, examples 
of PRCMs include curfews, gang injunctions, establishment of neighborhood watch 
associations, police checkpoints, etc). The table below represents a more complete list of 
PRCMs. 
Menu of Population and Resource Control Measures




•	 National ID card
•	 Biometrics database (if 
possible linked with ID)
•	 Curfew
•	 Press controls
•	 Designating and protect-
ing critical infrastructure 
(public health, utilities)
•	 Establishing pass system 
to further control move-
ment within provincial 
areas
•	 Physical barriers to seg-
regate the population 




•	 Search and seizures.
Population and resource control measures menu (from Vance Klosinski, 2009)
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Picking and applying the right PRCM can only be accomplished once a thorough area 
assessment is complete because the COIN force must have a solid grasp of the cultural and 
societal norms of the population the measures are meant to control. As the work of Klosinki 
and Eric Wendt shows, if the PRCMs are not in tune with the local population, the COIN 
force risks further alienating the population and adding fuel to the fire in regards to the 
insurgency, e.g., establishing checkpoints in Iraq or Afghanistan with no female soldiers 
available. Who then checks the women since Muslim culture forbids male soldiers or police 
from inspecting females?)Assessments help the counterinsurgent force understand the mul-
tiple issues and needs of differing districts or villages or even neighborhoods, and help pro-
vide for tailored, targeted solutions since cookie cutter approaches will not work in a COIN 
environment For example, one village may be concerned about education while another is 
more concerned about clean drinking water One key point to remember when conducting 
assessments: accurate and localized assessments can only be conducted by individuals who 
live or operate in the area they are assessing. Drive-by views of a local neighborhood or facts 
compiled in some headquarters do not necessarily provide ground truth. 
In addition a thorough assessment allows the commander to identify who the influential 
leaders are in his area of operations. With their advice and support, it is more likely that the 
PRCMs will succeed and prove legitimate in the eyes of the population. By engaging these 
leaders early on, the COIN force provides them an outlet for redress and the ability to offer 
continuous input which can help diffuse major problems as they arise in the future. 
Lastly, a thorough assessment will also provide insight on the local business activity and, to 
the extent possible, help the commander avoid PRCMs that disrupt business since that is 
one of the fastest ways to turn the local powers brokers against the COIN force/legitimate 
authority. 
The short narrative below, taken directly out of the Army’s “COIN Manual,” Field Manual 
3-24, demonstrates how the military has applied PRCMs in Iraq. 
Clear-Hold-Build in Tal Afar
In early 2005, the city of Tal Afar in northern Iraq had become a focal point for Iraqi 
insurgent efforts. The insurgents tried to assert control over the population. They used 
violence and intimidation to inflame ethnic and sectarian tensions. They took control of all 
schools and mosques, while destroying police stations. There were frequent abductions and 
executions. The insurgents achieved some success as the populace divided into communities 
defined by sectarian boundaries. Additionally, Tal Afar became an insurgent support base 
and sanctuary for launching attacks in the major regional city of Mosul and throughout 
Nineveh province.
Menu of Population and Resource Control Measures (cont.)
Strategic (National Level) Operational (Provincial or 
Multi-Provincial Level)
Tactical (City, Village)




erships records, business 
permits)
•	 Mobilizing reserves and 
auxiliaries
•	 Border security regulations 
(immigration/customs)
•	 Travel restrictions
•	 Bans or strict control of 
public assembly
•	 Control of cell phone sim 
cards
•	 Population relocation 
programs
•	 Parole or probation 
programs
•	 Dissolution of organizations 
that advocate or support 
insurgents
•	 Forgiveness and rehabilita-
tion (Amnesty/pardon)
•	 National level economic 
recovery programs
•	 Designating limited ac-
cess areas.
•	 Declaring items and 
quantities of items as 
contraband




dinating civil affairs 
projects to maximize 
effects.
•	 COIN force command-
ers distribute resources 
(ISR, engineer support 
for building, money) in 
order to facilitate syn-
chronized PRCM plan.
•	 Provincial level economic 
recovery programs.
•	 Block control system 
(block registra-
tion, wardens, and 
committees).
•	 Increased popula-
tion and key resource 
monitoring and 
surveillance.
•	 Local visitor registra-
tion requirements.
•	 Extended pass system 
to control local travel.
•	 Raids/targeted 
killings to eliminate 
insurgent leader 
hierarchy.
•	 Tribal and local leader 
engagement.
•	 Reparations for dam-
age and aid coerced by 
insurgents.
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During the summer of 2005, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) assumed the lead 
for military efforts in and around Tal Afar. In the months that followed, the 3d ACR ap-
plied a clear-hold-build approach to reclaim Tal Afar from the insurgents.
Destruction or Expulsion of Insurgent Forces (Clear)
In August 2005, the 3d ACR and Iraqi forces began the process of destroying the insur-
gency in Tal Afar. Their first step was to conduct reconnaissance to understand the enemy 
situation; understand the ethnic, tribal, and sectarian dynamics; and set the conditions 
for effective operations. Iraqi security forces and U.S. Soldiers isolated the insurgents from 
external support by controlling nearby border areas and creating an eight-foot-high berm 
around the city. The berm’s purpose was to deny the enemy freedom of movement and 
safe haven in outlying communities. The berm prevented free movement of fighters and 
weapons and forced all traffic to go through security checkpoints manned by U.S. and 
Iraqi forces. Multinational checkpoints frequently included informants who could identify 
insurgents. Multinational forces supervised the movement of civilians out of contentious 
areas. Forces conducted house-to-house searches. When they met violent resistance, they 
used precision fires from artillery and aviation. Targets were chosen through area recon-
naissance operations, interaction with the local populace, and information from U.S. and 
Iraqi sources. Hundreds of insurgents were killed or captured during the encirclement and 
clearing of the city. Carefully controlled application of violence limited the cost to residents.
Deployment of Security Forces (Hold)
Following the defeat of enemy fighters, U.S. and Iraqi forces established security inside Tal 
Afar. The security forces immediately enhanced personnel screening at checkpoints based 
on information from the local population. To enhance police legitimacy in the people’s 
eyes, multinational forces began recruiting Iraqi police from a more diverse, representative 
mix comprising city residents and residents of surrounding communities. Police recruits 
received extensive training in a police academy. 
U.S. forces and the Iraqi Army also trained Iraqi police in military skills. Concurrently, the 
local and provincial government dismissed or prosecuted Iraqi police involved in offenses 
against the populace. The government assigned new police leaders to the city from Mosul 
and other locations. U.S. forces assisted to ensure Iraqi Army, police, and their own forces 
shared common boundaries and were positioned to provide mutual support to one another. 
At the same time, U.S. forces continued to equip and train a border defense brigade, which 
increased the capability to interdict the insurgents’ external support. Among its successes, 
the multinational force destroyed an insurgent network that included a chain of safe houses 
between Syria and Tal Afar.
Improving Living Conditions and Restoring Normalcy (Build)
With insurgents driven out of their city, the local population accepted guidance and proj-
ects to reestablish control by the Iraqi government. The 3d ACR commander noted, “The 
people of Tal Afar understood that this was an operation for them—an operation to bring 
back security to the city.”
With the assistance of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment’s Office of Transition Initiatives, efforts to reestablish municipal and economic 
systems began in earnest. These initiatives included providing essential services (water, 
electricity, sewage, and trash collection), education projects, police stations, parks, and 
reconstruction efforts. A legal claims process and compensation program to address local 
grievances for damages was also established.
As security and living conditions in Tal Afar improved, citizens began providing informa-
tion that helped eliminate the insurgency’s infrastructure. In addition to information 
received on the streets, multinational forces established joint coordination centers in Tal 
Afar and nearby communities that became multinational command posts and intelligence-
sharing facilities with the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police. Unity of effort by local Iraqi 
leaders, Iraqi security forces, and U.S. forces was critical to success. Success became evident 
when many families who had fled the area returned to the secured city. 
Once the COIN force decides on appropriate PRCMs, there is a need for continual reas-
sessment of their effectiveness to determine how long they should continue, and to gage the 
effect on the population. The COIN force/government should have already publically de-
fined the conditions that must be met before the population control measures are reduced. 
Finally, the COIN force commander must also do a thorough analysis of how his PRCM 
measures may cause second and third order effects in other areas (such as neighborhoods in 
the case of local law enforcement).
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THREE STEPS TO BUILDING AND 
OPERATING NETWORKS 
JOHN ARQUILLA
Over the past decade, the word “network” has come into wide use in describing terrorist, 
insurgent and criminal organizations. It is a term far less useful for purposes of describing 
efforts to fight these enemies. This is because, far from building nimble networks of 
our own, most of the institutional design work done in recent years has been focused 
on developing and expanding massive new hierarchies—the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Directorate of National Intelligence come to mind in particular. 
Both of these entities have shown their balkiness over the past five years, from the mishan-
dling of the Katrina disaster to the continuing threat posed by al Qaeda. In large part, these 
failures are organizational in nature. Good, dedicated people fill the ranks of these and 
many other hierarchies. But they are held back by their own institutions from doing what is 
necessary to cope with disaster and defeat insurgency, terror and crime. 
Yet there is a way ahead, beyond the traditional wisdom of bureaucratic stovepiping and 
the enduring emphasis on mass, overwhelming force and “shock and awe.” The proper 
path ahead lies in building networks as supple as those of the terrorists and criminal gangs 
that darken our world, “good networks” that anticipate and respond swiftly to emerging 
crises—man-made and natural. The answer lies in a belief in the quality of our people, and 
in the faith that empowering them fully in loose-knit, laterally connected, lightly controlled 
networks, will win the day.
There are but three simple steps to take in order to build and operate effective networks. 
They are: 
1. Create many small “units of action.” 
Most organizations today can be characterized as comprised of a relatively few large 
things that have been centralized in a few big places. The U.S. military is a good ex-
ample of this, with most of its roughly two million active service members poured into 
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a handful of divisions, naval battle groups and air wings. The example of the early years 
of the Iraq insurgency is particularly telling, when about 170,000 American soldiers 
were concentrated on just a few dozen relatively remote, small-city-sized operating 
bases. The problem with this “few and large” approach was that it left large portions 
of Iraq unprotected, and response times to fleeting, deadly attacks were measured in 
hours, not minutes. 
But, starting late in 2006, the U.S. military shifted to a “small and many” approach, es-
tablishing hundreds of platoon-sized outposts in the most dangerous areas in Iraq. This 
improved our presence and deterred many terrorist acts. During 2007, violence overall 
in Iraq dropped by nearly 90% thanks to this network, which in its entirety never 
required more than about 10% of U.S. troops in country to serve in the outposts or in 
activities related to their protection. In short, “the surge” of some 20,000 additional 
troops was never needed. The network did more, with tremendous economy of force. 
2. Emphasize “finding” before trying to fight. 
The biggest problem in countering dark networks of insurgents, terrorists and criminals 
is the need to illuminate them. It is all too easy for them to slip the heavy punches of 
shock-an-awe bombing—or even of sustained Predator campaigns. So those who fight 
them must first become “sensory organizations” before they can start shooting. In the 
abovementioned Iraq example, “finding” was greatly aided both by the simple fact of 
having more local presence and by the fact that this presence encouraged locals to share 
intelligence about weapons caches, impending attacks and the like. 
The central problem today in Afghanistan, and in American cities trying to cope with 
criminal gang networks, is that of developing sufficient information about their compo-
sition, dispositions and intentions. The network-as-sensory-organization mitigates this 
terrible problem by both helping to generate more information and by being able to act 
more swiftly on the basis of sometimes fleeting, always time-urgent intelligence about 
intentions.
3. Learn to “swarm” one’s targets from all directions. 
Assuming that Steps 1 and 2 have been completed—that is, a network of the “small 
and many” has been formed, and has generated a substantial amount of actionable 
intelligence, it is now time for the third step of engaging the enemy. To continue the 
Iraq example, the action phase there did not consist of massive sweeps or sustained 
bombing—far from it. Instead, the many small units in the outposts, the small strike 
teams working with them from the outside, and friendly local forces teamed up to strike 
at al Qaeda cadres from all directions. Their safe houses were blown, their weapons 
caches unearthed, and everywhere they turned they ran into small fire teams coming at 
them. It is no surprise the insurgency collapsed. 
The same pattern will hold in other venues, whether the opponents are insurgents, ter-
rorists or criminal gangs. Perhaps the best example of an organization that fit all three 
categories was the Mau Mau gangs back in Kenya during the 1950s, which committed 
all three types of acts. The British, who had failed with bombing and military sweep 
operations, shifted to smaller teams, and focused on finding Mau Mau cells, largely 
via information gleaned from actions taken by members of the dark network who had 
“turned.” The result was striking, the victory swift and convincing. 
Three simple steps. But they are also three big leaps. They call for a willingness to: 1) 
engage in fundamental organizational redesign; 2) show great patience in the information-
gathering period; and 3) believe in the ability of even quite junior operatives to show good 
judgment and use authority wisely. If militaries move in this direction in a sustained way, 
the world will become far less permissive of insurgency and terror. If law enforcement 
organizations embrace this paradigm, transnational criminal and urban gang networks will 
be put on, and kept on, the run. 
Three simple steps. Well worth taking.
This essay builds upon themes developed in the author’s “The New Rules of War,” the cover article in the March/
April (2010) issue of the magazine Foreign Policy. 
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The key problem when fighting an insurgency is finding the insurgents. The insurgents hide 
themselves because they are engaged in an illegal activity. No matter how well they hide 
themselves, however, insurgents must have contact with people and institutions outside the 
insurgent organization. They must have this contact because they need to gather resources 
in order to keep fighting and because ultimately they want to take over institutions as part 
of their effort to take over the country. When the insurgents come out of hiding to operate, 
law enforcement representatives are most likely to come into contact with them. For this 
reason, the police have a critical role in countering insurgents.
Typically, the police do not initially perform their key role well. The focus of policing is on 
individuals and crimes that have already been committed. Gathering evidence against a sus-
pect is the purpose of police work. If the individual is a member of an organization in whose 
service he has committed the crime, however, then focusing on his act is only part of the 
job. Just as the individual who committed the crime is subordinate to the organization, so 
should dealing with the individual be subordinate to the more important task of countering 
the organization. Apprehension of the individual should not be the end but the beginning 
of police activity. The key thing is not what the individual did but what he knows. Indeed, 
the evidence implicating the individual is important primarily not because it will lead to his 
conviction but because it can provide leverage against the individual to encourage him to 
share what he knows about his organization. Since this is not the way police normally think 
of their work, they initially do not carry out their work in a way that is most effective for 
counterinsurgency.
Initial failure occurs often in part because for a certain period of time no one may recognize 
that an insurgency is underway or the authorities may not take seriously the claims that one 
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is underway. Usually, it takes an outrageous act of violence or two before a government takes 
the insurgent threat seriously and seeks to meet it. 
Organized crime and insurgency are similar in that individual crimes are part of a larger 
organizational activity and in the time it often takes for government and police to adapt to 
the requirements of fighting organizations. Indeed, the adjustment to fighting organized 
crime can be more difficult because organized crime does not challenge the government 
or the police. Its purpose is not to take over or replace an existing government but to live 
parasitically within the order that the government and the police provide. More so than 
insurgents, organized criminals are likely to try to co-opt rather than replace the police. 
(Although if the authorities go after organized crime, the criminals may fight back.) Thus 
it may take longer for the police and the government to realize the problem that organized 
crime represents. 
The key problem in attacking an illegal organization, whether criminal or political, is 
identifying it, its leaders and structure. As noted, the police, as the force on the streets, are 
often the first ones to note activity suggesting an illegal organization. Out of the general 
background information available to the police, patterns may emerge. This background 
information includes crime and arrest statistics but is more likely to be observations of ac-
tivities or individuals or signs (anything from literature to flags or other symbols) that stand 
out as odd or new in a given neighborhood. Comments from citizens or anecdotes heard or 
observations made in the course of normal police activity may reveal anomalies indicating 
that organized illegal activity is occurring.
At this point, it becomes necessary for the police to make the transition from focusing on 
the individual criminal to focusing on the organization. Any arrest becomes an opportunity 
to seek information about the organization. Even suspects not formally involved with the 
organization may know something about it, so all those arrested or those with whom the 
police routinely interact become possible sources of information.
Effective questioning of individuals assumes that those doing the questioning know about 
the organization. Effectively countering the organization requires developing some officers 
who specialize in understanding it. Since the illegal organization typically operates over a 
wide area and outside any one local jurisdiction, learning about it and effectively countering 
it requires centralization of information and authority at some level. This is often but does 
not have to be at the national level. This is another reason that police often fail initially in 
dealing with organized illegal activity. Police traditionally operate in a more decentralized 
manner than military forces, for example, with precincts having a fair degree of autonomy. 
This is not an effective way to organize the intelligence gathering necessary to counter illegal 
organizations. It is important to note, however, that while a central office may be neces-
sary to organize the fight, the whole police force should remain involved, at a minimum 
as information collectors. Gathering information about illegal organizations takes place in 
three stages, which typically overlap and run simultaneously as the process continues. First, 
anomalies in background information suggest that an organized illegal activity is occurring. 
Second, questioning of suspects, informants, technical collection, and information from 
other law enforcement or intelligence organizations builds on the background information 
and leads to a picture of the structure of the organization and the identification of its per-
sonnel. Third, additional collection and analysis allows the police to arrest key personnel.
As noted, police have a key role in countering all illegal organizations, whether criminal or 
political. Their ability to play this role depends on their ability move beyond routine police 
work focused on individual criminals to focusing on illegal organizations as organizations. 
Underlying both aspects is police immersion in and engagement with the community.
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GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS—ISSUED ON 01 AUGUST 2010
Team, here is my guidance for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. 
In keeping with the admonition in this guidance to “learn and adapt,” I will update this 
document periodically in the months ahead. Indeed, this edition is my first update, as I 
received useful feedback on the initial draft from Afghan partners and also received advice 
from elders and Special Forces teams in Herat Province’s Zericho Valley. I welcome further 
feedback. 
As I noted during my assumption of command remarks, it is a privilege to serve with each 
of you in this hugely important endeavor. And I appreciate all that you will do in helping to 
turn this guidance into reality on the ground. 
Secure and serve the population. The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people 
are the center of gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust and 
confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail. 
Live among the people. We can’t commute to the fight. Position joint bases and com-
bat outposts as close to those we’re seeking to secure as is feasible. Decide on locations 
with input from our partners and after consultation with local citizens and informed by 
intelligence and security assessments.
Help confront the culture of impunity. The Taliban are not the only enemy of the 
people. The people are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption, and 
abuse of power—recruiters for the Taliban. President Karzai has forthrightly commit-
ted to combat these threats. Work with our Afghan partners to help turn his words into 
reality and to help our partners protect the people from malign actors as well as from 
terrorists.
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Help Afghans build accountable governance. Afghanistan has a long history of 
representative self-government at all levels, from the village shura to the government 
in Kabul. Help the government and the people revive those traditions and help them 
develop checks and balances to prevent abuses.
Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Together with our Afghan partners, get our teeth into 
the insurgents and don’t let go. When the extremists fight, make them pay. Seek out 
and eliminate those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the in-
nocent. Target the whole network, not just individuals. 
Fight hard and fight with discipline. Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the 
firepower needed to win a fight. We can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill 
or capture our way to victory. Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their property in 
the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations elimi-
nate. That’s exactly what the Taliban want. Don’t fall into their trap. We must continue 
our efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.
Identify corrupt officials. President Karzai has said, “My government is committed 
to fighting corruption with all means possible.” Help the government achieve that 
aim. Make sure the people we work with work for the people. If they don’t, work with 
partners to enable action, or we will appear to be part of the problem. Bring networks 
of malign actors to the attention of trusted Afghan partners and your chain of com-
mand. Act with your Afghan partners to confront, isolate, pressure, and defund malign 
actors—and, where appropriate, to refer malign actors for prosecution.
Hold what we secure. Together with our Afghan partners, develop the plan to hold an 
area (and to build in it) before starting to clear or secure it. The people need to know 
that we will not abandon them. Prioritize population security over short-duration 
disruption operations. And when we begin to transition to Afghan lead, thin out 
rather than handing off and withdrawing, maintaining headquarters even as we reduce 
combat elements.
Foster lasting solutions. Help our Afghans partners create good governance and en-
during security. Avoid compromises with malign actors that achieve short-term gains at 
the expense of long-term stability. Think hard before pursuing initiatives that may not 
be sustainable in the long run. When it comes to projects, small is often beautiful.
Money is ammunition; don’t put it in the wrong hands. Institute “COIN contract-
ing.” Pay close attention to the impact of our spending and understand who benefits 
from it. And remember, we are who we fund. How we spend is often more important 
than how much we spend. 
Be a good guest. Treat the Afghan people and their property with respect. Think about 
how we drive, how we patrol, how we relate to people, and how we help the commu-
nity. View our actions through the eyes of the Afghans and, together with our partners, 
consult with elders before pursuing new initiatives and operations. 
Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out. Earn the 
people’s trust, talk to them, ask them questions, and learn about their lives. Inquire 
about social dynamics, frictions, local histories, and grievances. Hear what they say. 
Be aware of others in the room and how their presence may affect the answers you 
get. Cross-check information and make sure you have the full story. Avoid knee-jerk 
responses based on first impressions. Don’t be a pawn in someone else’s game. Spend 
time, listen, consult, and drink lots of tea.
Walk. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot whenever possible and engage the popula-
tion. Take off your sunglasses. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting 
face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oakleys.
Act as one team. Work closely with our international and Afghan partners, civilian as 
well as military. Treat them as brothers-in-arms. Unity of effort and cooperation are not 
optional. 
Partner with the ANSF. Live, eat, train, plan, and operate together. Depend on one 
another. Hold each other accountable at all echelons down to trooper level. Help our 
ANSF partners achieve excellence. Respect them and listen to them. Be a good role 
model.
Promote local reintegration. Together with our Afghan partners, identify and separate 
the “reconcilables” from the “irreconcilables.” Identify and report obstacles to reintegra-
tion. Help our partners address grievances and strive to make the reconcilables part of 
the local solution, even as we work with our partners to identify and kill, capture, drive 
out, or “turn” the irreconcilables.
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Be first with the truth. Beat the insurgents and malign actors to the headlines. Preempt 
rumors. Get accurate information to the chain of command, to Afghan leaders, to the 
people, and to the press as soon as possible. Integrity is critical to this fight. Avoid spin-
ning, and don’t try to “dress up” an ugly situation. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, 
including civilian casualties, and then state how we’ll respond and what we’ve learned. 
Fight the information war aggressively. Challenge disinformation. Turn our enemies’ 
extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them. 
Hang their barbaric actions like millstones around their necks. 
Manage expectations. Avoid premature declarations of success. Note what has been 
accomplished and what still needs to be done. Strive to under-promise and over-deliver. 
Live our values. Stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from 
our enemies. We are engaged in a tough endeavor. It is often brutal, physically demand-
ing, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we must not give in to 
dark impulses or tolerate unacceptable actions by others.
Maintain continuity through unit transitions. From day one, start building the infor-
mation you’ll provide to your successors. Share information and understanding in the 
months before transitions. Strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships 
throughout transitions to avoid giving insurgents and malign actors a rest.
Empower subordinates. Resource to enable decentralized action. Push assets and au-
thorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Flatten report-
ing chains (while maintaining hierarchical decision chains). Remember that it is those 
at tactical levels—the so-called “strategic sergeants” and “strategic captains”—who turn 
big ideas in counterinsurgency operations into reality on the ground.
Win the battle of wits. Learn and adapt more quickly than the enemy. Be cunning. 
Outsmart the insurgents. Share best practices and lessons learned. Create and exploit 
opportunities. 
Exercise initiative. In the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders 
should have been and execute them aggressively. 
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